State Pollution Statutes
David P. Curriet
The explosion of new pollution control legislation in the last
few years is a familiar phenomenon. As an intimate participant in
the Illinois branch of this experience, I have published a pair of
articles attempting to analyze the Illinois program from the inside.1 This article is a preliminary tour of the pollution laws of
other states. My hope is to expose general patterns of pollution
control legislation, to offer comparative judgments, and to uncover
new ideas. No pretense is made that one can adequately evaluate a
pollution control program by the statutes alone. The true test lies
in the performance of the administering agency. Unfortunately, the
sheer size of the task precludes an investigation of agency practice
in each of the fifty states. But while a sound statutory framework
is no guarantee of a vigorous, reasonable program, it is an indispensable prerequisite. A study of the statutes alone may therefore
be a useful first step toward understanding how well the states are
doing.
The efforts to control both air and water pollution are increasingly dominated by federal statutes.2 Inadequate state authority
thus does not necessarily ensure that there will be too much pollution. State efforts remain important, however. In the first place,
the federal laws are not comprehensive. They are patchworks dealing with certain prominent problems, and in the areas they leave
unregulated, state law is indispensable. Moreover, the federal programs attempting to alleviate air and water pollution rely heavily
on state participation, through state plans for implementing fedt Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Member, Illinois Air
Pollution Control Board, 1969-70; Illinois Coordinator of Environmental Quality, 1970;
Chairman, Illinois Pollution Control Board, 1970-72. This paper is based upon a research
project undertaken by Margaret Conable, J.D. The University of Chicago 1980. My thanks
also to Rodrigo Howard, of the class of 1982, for extensive assistance in verifying the many
statements of the law.
I Currie, Rulemaking Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 42 U. CHL L. REv. 457 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Rulemaking]; Enforcement Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 70 Nw.
U.L. REv. 389 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Enforcement].
2 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. II 1978);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978).
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eral air quality standards' and state administration of the national
pollutant discharge elimination system ("NPDES") for water pollution control.

4

This investigation is focused on laws concerned with air and
water pollution. The analysis seeks to highlight important features
on a functional basis, without attempting to describe the details of
each state's program.
I.

INTRODUCTION:

THE ORIGINS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION

The central principles governing pollution control are easily
stated. If we do too little to prevent pollution, we may wipe ourselves out; if we do too much, we may go back to the Dark Ages.5
Translating these postulates into a real-life program, however, is a
formidable task for the social architect, and the source of acute
controversy.
A. The Market
Much travail (including this article) could be avoided if that
deity of economists, The Market, could be counted on to control
pollution. But even the faithful acknowledge that it cannot be. The
difficulty is that much of the harm done by a polluter falls upon
others. In his rational self-interest, the polluter may be willing to
destroy an entire county to make an extra dime. He would not do
so if the victim offered him twenty cents to stop, but in the real
world the victim cannot always make the offer. In the typical pollution case, the harm is suffered not by one but by thousands. The
costs of transacting with so many people will in some cases be high
enough that the bargain to maximize society's wealth by reducing
pollution will not be made.6 Thus, concludes the economist, if the
law does not intervene there will be too much pollution.7
3

42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. 1 1978).

4 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).

5 For introductory surveys of the sources, effects, and cures of air pollution, see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY, ENvmoNMENTAL QUALITY

61-91 (1970); Note, Air Pollution:

Causes, Sources and Abatement, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 205. For much more detailed information, see Am PoLLuToN (3d ed. A. Stern 1977).
6 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 15-16 (1960).
7 There is another argument that also holds appeal for economists. In the arid western
states, the traditional law of water rights, which vaguely entitled each landowner to "reasonable" use of the stream, was replaced by a rule granting the first taker a permanent right to
use the water. The rationale was that some protection against losing the water to later users
was necessary to encourage investment in the irrigation works indispensable to western de-
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B. Private Remedies
Travail would also be reduced if we could leave- the problem to
private lawsuits brought against polluters by their victims. Such
suits have long been permitted, and they serve useful purposes; but
they cannot suffice. We can guard against possible economic inefficiency in such actions by refusing to enjoin pollution that produces
net social benefits and by requiring victims to take steps to minimize their losses.9 We can do away by statute0 with artificial limitations on the right of injured people to sue." We can counter the
reluctance of pollution victims to incur large litigation costs by the
prospect of fat attorney's fees in a class action. Yet the ultimate
inadequacy of the best private law was writ large by a class action
filed not long ago on behalf of seven million residents of the Los
Angeles area against 1,293 defendants, most of them unknown and
unnamed, asking a court to do something to improve the air.'2 The
court quite properly threw its hands up and the suit out. The belief that a lawsuit is the best way to determine not only the optivelopment. See Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo. 308, 318-19, 44 P. 845, 847 (1896). The same
considerations suggest the desirability of some legal assurance that expenditures to put land
to beneficial use will not be rendered vain by subsequent pollution.
We have come this far without mentioning the argument that government should take
action against pollution because it is wrong. Professor Coase has admonished us that one
landowner injures another by preventing him from running a polluting business. Coase,
supra note 6, at 2. It is likewise true that the prohibition of punching noses limits liberty,
but many would find a moral basis for the philosopher's conclusion that freedom to extend
the arm ends at the next person's nose. There are difficulties in distinguishing "mine" from
"thine" when every action affects one's neighbor, but logic seems unlikely to overcome the
widely shared view that one who throws "too much" filth upon his neighbors has done them
wrong. See Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its UtilitarianConstraints,8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979). See also J. Esposrro, VANISHING Am (1970). How much is too much
is of course the crucial question.
8 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970) (semble).
I Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972), is
illustrative of this general approach.
10 E.g., MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1980). See Sax & Conner,
Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. Rv.
1003 (1972).
1 E.g., Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 90 N.J.L. 203, 101 A. 379 (1917) (riparian
landowner could not maintain a public nuisance action because his injury was not shown to
be different from that suffered by the public in general).
1"Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1971). For additional discussion of the difficulties of private actions to redress pollution, see Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality (pt. 1), 52
IOWA L. REv. 186, 196-201 (1966).
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mum pollution level in Los Angeles, but also who should take what
steps to achieve it, is a pipe dream.
C. Emission Charges
A favorite refuge of those seeking to avoid the horrors of bureaucratic regulation is to make polluters consider the true costs of
their actions by imposing emission charges taxing them in the
amount of the harm they do to others."3 The argument is attractive. Not only will the rational polluter stop polluting before causing a net harm to society; 14 taxation also serves our sense of fairness by requiring payment for using public resources-the air or
the water-as a receptacle for private wastes.
The difficulty of determining the level at which emission taxes
or charges should be set, however, has precluded their widespread
use. In order to achieve optimal pollution control, the charge
should reflect the cost of the damage done by each unit of a contaminant emitted. Quantifying pollution damage even in the gross
has proved problematic for economists, however. 15 The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that the damage done by any given unit of
contamination varies widely according to a host of factors. A stated
quantity of sulfur dioxide, for example, may do no detectable harm
at all if emitted in an area where there are no other emissions; yet
when it is added to existing discharges of the same pollutant in a
heavily contaminated area, it could mean the difference between
life and death. Moreover, the identical quantity discharged may
have a more acute effect on air quality, and thus do more damage,
if emitted at ground level rather than through a high stack, or during calm rather than windy weather, or in a confined river valley
rather than on a plain. The same quantity of hydrocarbon emissions may cause a more serious oxidant problem in Denver than in
Minneapolis because of the higher altitude and greater prevalence
of sunlight. Identical sulfur dioxide emissions may be more harmful in the presence of high particulate concentrations. Further,
even the same levels of ambient air quality may do more harm in
13

See, e.g., A. KNEmSE & B. BowER, MANAGING WATER QUALrrY: EcONOMICS,
97-179, 237-53, 315-18 (1968).

TECHNOL-

OGY, INSTITnTONS

14 The rational polluter will pay the emission charge only so long as it is less than the
cost of abating the pollution. Thus, whenever the cost of abatement is less than the damage
done by pollution, the rational polluter will not pollute.
18 See Ridker, Strategies for Measuring the Cost of Air Pollution, in THE ECONOmiCS
OF Am POLLUON 87 (H. Wolozin ed. 1966).
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New York City, where there are many people and much valuable
property, than in an uninhabited desert. Pollution will do more
harm to the elderly and ill than to healthy young adults, and least
6
of all to those who take precautions against it.2
Given these uncertainties, any tax that is set would probably
be highly arbitrary, and the likelihood that it would result in anything resembling an optimal degree of control is slim. Most legislative bodies have therefore understandably placed primary reliance
on subjective but candid efforts to determine optimal levels of pollution by direct governmental prescription.
That we would have too much pollution without regulation or
taxes, and that accurate taxation may be impracticable, does not
prove that we should regulate. The costs of administration are an
ever-present constraint upon the thoroughness of regulatory performance, and it is theoretically possible that such costs could exceed the benefits of reduced pollution.17 Given the vast potential
for pollution damage, however, and the economic certainty of excessive damage in the absence of substantial government intervention, it is not to be expected that society will back off from its
conclusion that regulation, despite its imperfections, is on balance
likely to do more good than harm.
D. Public Nuisance
The decision that regulation is needed takes us only to the
threshold of a myriad of refractory problems. What governmental
institutions should be set up to deal with pollution?
The traditional, almost knee-jerk response of our legal system
to the perception that government should act is to make something
a crime. We began doing this long ago in response to the problem
of pollution. Both the common law and supplementary statutes
typically make air or water pollution a public nuisance,' which the
courts can either penalize or order abated upon suit by the ordinary public prosecutor.1 9 There is utility in such provisions: without the mounting procedural difficulties associated with class ac16

See
See
18 See
1' For
17

generally J. Esposrro, supra note 7, at 9-19.
Coase, supra note 6, at 18.
W. PROSSmR, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTs 583-91 (4th ed. 1971).
instance, a 1969 Illinois statute, based upon the perceived need to supplement

the work of indolent regulatory agencies, gave such powers to the state attorney general. ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 14, 1 12 (1979).
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tions, 2° they

make it practicable to bring to book the large polluter
whose devastations are too scattered to justify a private suit.
To doubt the adequacy of public-nuisance law, however, one
need only recall the private suit described above, seeking to remedy air pollution in Los Angeles. 21 When the pollution problem results from the interaction of a multitude of sources, it is fantasy to
suppose that substitution of the public prosecutor for the citizen
plaintiff makes a court an appropriate forum. In addition, the
highly technical information base necessary to the intelligent resolution of many pollution problems argues for the creation of a separate, expert staff. Moreover, in order to avoid shutting down civilization, a public nuisance law must leave it to the court to decide
in each particular case whether the offending activity causes excessive harm in light of its utility. The resultant vagueness of the
standard is a formidable deterrent to voluntary compliance. If one
cannot be sure what the law requires until after a lawsuit, one may
very well postpone large pollution control expenditures, either in
the hope that they may be found unnecessary or for fear that they
may be wasted if one has underestimated the requirements and is
forced to start over.
E. Administrative Agencies
Considerations such as these have induced American governments to turn to separate administrative bodies invested with authority over pollution control, and, as will appear below, to entrust
those administrators with rulemaking and adjudicative as well as
with prosecutorial functions. State and local agencies slumbered
quietly, on the whole, for many years. Around 1970, however, widespread public dissatisfaction with past control efforts triggered a
wave of new and more vigorous environmental legislation. One result was the body of state statutes to which we now turn.
20 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (plaintiff must bear cost
of individual notice to each class member); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973) (even when some class members satisfy federal minimum jurisdictional amount, no
ancillary jurisdiction over other members with separate claims who do not); Snyder v. Har-

ris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (no aggregation of class members' separate claims to satisfy amount

requirement).
21 See text and note at note 12 supra.
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II. RULEMAKING

A.

Delegation and its Limits

One prominent defect of the public-nuisance law, as I have
suggested, was its lack of prior warning to the polluter as to which
preventive measures were required. Not surprisingly, one virtually
universal feature of modern state pollution laws is their focus upon
the development of detailed, specific standards prescribing the limits of permissible pollution for various contaminants and sources.
In devising these standards, the technical complexity of the
problem argues for specialization. It would be possible in theory to
leave rulemaking to the legislature, as in such other highly detailed
fields as income taxation and traffic control." But legislators are
busy generalists whose responsibility is to make the big political
decisions; as the reality is that the details of a specific pollution
code would be largely determined by a technical staff anyway, the
nearly universal decision has been, as in many other complex fields
such as railroad ratemaking,23 aircraft safety,' and occupational
health,' 5 to join power with responsibility and to seek a more professional product by eliminating the pretense of legislative
adoption.26
1.

Maine: Legislative Adoption. Maine provides an interest-

ing exception to the prevailing pattern. The basic provisions ap" E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95

, If 11-100 to -1507.1 (1979).

49 U.S.C. §§ 10701-10786 (Special Pamphlet 1979).
2 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
' See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111
, 1 1010 (1979). At one time the doctrine that
legislative power was vested in Congress and state legislatures and could not be delegated
presented serious obstacles to administrative rulemaking. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The nondelegation doctrine reflects, among
other things, a constitutional policy of preserving direct popular control of lawmaking. See
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 22 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The doctrine has yielded so far to the practicalities
of modern government, however, that delegation of rulemaking authority will generally be
upheld, at least if the legislature has laid down intelligible general principles to govern the
exercise of the delegated power. See, e.g., Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
426 U.S. 548 (1976). The old view still surfaces from time to time in the state courts. See,
e.g., Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227 (1960); State v. Richmond,
36 Ohio Misc. 55, 302 N.E.2d 605, 606 (Mun. Ct. 1973) (holding that environmental protection director's discretionary authority to adopt regulations "imposes on the people of this
sovereign state a government by one man"), rev'd sub nom. State v. Acme Scrap Iron &
Metal, 49 Ohio App. 2d 371, 361 N.E.2d 250 (1974). In most states, however, the courts have
given short shrift to delegation attacks on the pollution law. Illinois is one example. See
Currie, Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 460-61.
2S
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pear traditional enough. The Board of Environmental Protection is
directed to "exercis[e] the police power of the State, to control,
abate and prevent" both air and water pollution. 7 To accomplish
this task, the board is empowered to "adopt, amend and repeal
reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the proper administration and interpretation of any provision of law that the department is charged with the duty of administering"; rules duly
'28
promulgated "shall have the full force and effect of the law."
Other sections, however, reveal that many of the Board's most important regulations, such as air quality and emission standards, remain in effect only "until 90 days after the adjournment of the
next regular or special session of the legislature,"2 unless enacted
into statute. In other words, rules of these types are to be adopted
by the legislature itself, not by the Board.
This is carrying mistrust of the bureaucracy to extremes. As a
result the statute books in Maine are cluttered with technical details, such as a standard limiting sulfur dioxide emissions from sulfite pulping processes to "40 pounds per air dried ton of sulfite
pulp produced"3 0 and five pages of water quality classifications
governing the Little Androscoggin River system.$1 Correspondingly, there are almost no substantive regulations.3 2 For the legislature to concern itself seriously with such technicalities would take
more time than it could afford and would risk serious misunderstanding of technical issues. On the other hand, if the legislature
acts as a rubber stamp either for recommendations from the
Board, or for politically powerful interests, legislative responsibility is a hollow pretense.
In fact the Maine statutes, despite legislative jealousy of the
rulemaking power, delegate enormous discretion to the Board. Li-

27 ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 361 (West 1978).
- Id. § 343.
29 E.g., id. § 584 (West Supp. 1980) (ambient air quality standards). Formerly, the
agency could promulgate water classifications, although they were valid only until 90 days
after adjournment of the legislature if not enacted into statute. Id. § 367 (West 1978). In
1979 this authority was repealed. Now the agency may only recommend classifications to the
legislature. Id. (West Supp. 1980).
30 Id. § 604(2) (West 1978).
21 Id. § 368.
22 The only substantive regulations contained in ENV. REP., STATE WATER LAWS (BNA)
796:0502-03 (1979), limit discharges of phosphorus and heat. These were adopted during a
brief period when the Board enjoyed real rulemaking power, and their present validity
seems highly questionable. The only air pollution regulations are procedural. See ENv. RaP.,
STATE Am LAws (BNA) 396:0581 (1979).
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censing programs are established for sources of both air and water
pollutants. Among the conditions for issuance of a license is employment of "the best practicable treatment," which the Board
must essentially define for each license.33 Thus the Board apparently can avoid the necessity for legislative approval of emission
standards by determining them on a case-by-case basis in processing particular permit applications.
The disadvantages of lawmaking by adjudication were well described by the Federal Trade Commission in its famous opinion
justifying the rule requiring health warnings on cigarette packages.3 In adjudication, issues affecting an entire industry are resolved without affording all those affected the opportunity to be
heard. Voluntary compliance is discouraged, as under the publicnuisance doctrine, by the uncertainty of the law. Conduct undertaken in good faith may be penalized if it is later found unlawful.
The same issues of practicability or harm may have to be litigated
over and over again. Even the Maine legislature, by its vague definition of "best practicable treatment," has acknowledged its inability to cope with all the details of a pollution program. It should
thus allow the administering agency to express its exercise of discretion through the useful tool of rulemaking.
2. Michigan:Approval by Legislative Committee. The Michigan legislature apparently mistrusts administrative rulemaking
nearly as much as Maine does. Michigan's Water Resources Commission is authorized, among other things, to "establish such pollution standards for . . . waters of the state .

.

. as it shall deem

necessary,"3 5 and its Air Pollution Control Commission is empowered to "establish standards for ambient air quality and emissions."3 " Under Michigan's Administrative Procedures Act, however, no permanent regulation becomes effective without the
explicit approval of a committee composed of members of each
house of the legislature or the passage by both houses of an ap33 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 414-A(1)(D) (West Supp. 1979) (water); id. § 582(5-A)
(West 1978) (air); id. § 590 (West Supp. 1979) (air). The statutes broadly define "best prac-

ticable treatment" as the treatment method that "controls or reduces emissions. . . to the
lowest possible level," id. § 582(5-A) (West 1978), or is "best calculated to protect and improve" water quality, id. § 414-A(1)(D) (West Supp. 1979), in both cases "consider[ing] the
...existing state of technology, the effectiveness of the available alternatives ... and...
economic feasibility," id. § 582(5)(A) (West 1978).
" FTC, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes, 29 Fed. Reg.
8324, 8366-68 (1964).

SMICH.

Comp. LAws ANN.

- Id. § 336.15(a).

§ 323.5

(1975).
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proving resolution.37 In addition, regulations must be approved as
to form by the legislative service bureau and as to legality by the
attorney general.3 8 The absence of any corresponding criteria for
appraisal by the legislature or its joint committee implies that
those bodies are to conduct a free-wheeling reexamination of the
merits of proposed rules.
Any legislature that delegates rulemaking power to an administrative agency retains the right to overturn the actions of its delegate by enacting legislation. Thus there is nothing inimical to the
principle of delegated power in a requirement that regulations be
filed with the legislature, with a view to possible corrective legislation.3 9 Michigan, however, goes far beyond this. In requiring affirmative legislative approval of individual regulations, it flies in
the face of the principal reason for the delegation of rulemaking
power: the impracticability of thorough legislative consideration of
technical and time-consuming detail.
3. Ohio: Legislative Veto. Ohio authorizes administrative
adoption of a broad spectrum of regulations including water quality standards"0 and rules "for the prevention, control, and abatement of air pollution.' ' 1 But the Ohio Administrative Procedure
Act provides that the legislature may invalidate any regulation by
concurrent resolution, and that no regulation is effective for sixty
2
days pending legislative review.4
In theory the grounds for legislative disapproval are limited. A
joint committee is to recommend rejections only if the regulation
exceeds "statutory authority," "conflicts with another rule," or
"conflicts with the legislative intent in enacting the statute" under
which the rule is proposed. 3 Yet the statutory authority to fight
pollution is broadly phrased: disagreement with the conclusion

- Id. §§ 24.245, 24.235 (Supp. 1980). There is an exception for temporary "emergency"
measures, but only if the Governor certifies the existence of the emergency. Even then, the
regulation may be rescinded by concurrent resolution without the opportunity for gubernatorial veto that characterizes the normal legislative process. Id. § 24.248.

Id. § 24.245(1).
3' Washington does this. See WASH. REv.

§ 34.04.045 (West Supp. 1980); id.
§ 13141 (West Supp. 1979) (water quality
control plans not effective until reported to legislature); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1404
(Supp. 1979) (annual reports to the legislature and Governor required).

§ 34.04.160 (1965). See also CAL. WATR
40

OHIo Rzv.

CODE ANN.

CODE ANN.

CODE

§ 6111.041 (Page 1977).

Id. § 3704.03(E) (Page Supp. 1980).
4 Id. § 119.03(I). The only exception is if a gubernatorial certification of emergency
exists, in which case the regulation is effective, but for only 90 days. Id. § 119.03(F).
43 Id. § 119.03(I)(1)-(3).
41
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that a particular level of water quality is necessary to "protect[ ]
the public health and welfare, ' 44 for example, can easily be stated
as an argument that the agency has exceeded its authority or misread "legislative intent." In effect, it seems that there can be resolutions disapproving a regulation on the basis of the merits of 'an
agency determination.
Ohio is not so restrictive as Maine or Michigan; regulations
can become law without affirmative legislative action, and waiting
periods for legislative repeal are not exceptional. 5 What is unusual
about the Ohio statutes is that a concurrent resolution is substituted for legislation in the process of disapproval, apparently circumventing the governor's power of veto. Provisions of this kind
have come under serious criticism on grounds both of constitutionality and of policy."0 For purposes of this article, their principal
significance is that a legislative veto reduces the power of delegated
administrative lawmaking by making legislative reversal of regulations easier than it would be in the normal legislative process.
B.

The Scope of Rulemaking Powers

Those legislatures that are willing to delegate rulemaking authority take varying approaches to the problem. Some rely on (at
least ostensibly) broad grants of general rulemaking authority;
others couple such a grant with lists of specifically authorized
types of rules; and some prefer to confine the agency's powers to
particularized areas.
1. General Rulemaking Authority. A number of state statutes contain broad grants of general rulemaking authority over
pollution.47 One of the most sweeping is found in Kentucky, which
authorizes its Department of Natural Resources and Environmen44 Id. § 6111.041 (Page 1977).
" Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) (90-day waiting period for effectiveness of federal rules of
civil procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court).

44See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HRv. L. REv. 1369, 1373-75, 1378-81 (1977). Legislative

vetoes may unconstitutionally evade the executive veto and invade the judicial prerogatives
of statutory construction and review. They also may cause delay in rulemaking, add to the
legislative workload, frustrate the procedural checks on rulemaking by opening the process

to political horse trading, and complicate the interpretation of statutory intent by requiring
courts to decide whether legislative inaction constitutes implicit ratification.
'7 For example, New Mexico provides for administrative adoption of "regulations to
prevent or abate water pollution," N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-4(D) (1979). Similar provisions in
Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.020(10)(A) (Supp. 1979), and Mississippi, MIsS. CODE ANN.
§ 49-17-17(b), (i) (Supp. 1979), apply to both air and water.
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tal Protection, with the consent of the State Environmental Quality Commission, to promulgate "any rule or regulation pertaining
to the prevention, abatement, and control of existing or threatened
air or water pollution, disposal of waste, control of noise, or the use
of air, land, or water resources, or strip mining and reclamation."48
Such statutes provide maximum flexibility, permitting administrators to utilize whatever form of regulation may prove most appropriate to deal with an unpredictable variety of problems.
A common variant of this broad authority is illustrated by
Delaware and Connecticut statutes respectively empowering an administrator to adopt regulations "to effectuate the policy and purposes of this chapter"4 9 and "to carry out his functions, powers and
duties."' 10 The breadth of such a rulemaking grant depends upon
the breadth of the "policy and purposes" or "functions, powers,
and duties" described elsewhere in the statute. The Delaware provisions are typically comprehensive in this respect, including "control of pollution of the land, water, underwater and air resources
to protect the public health, safety and welfare" 51 among the

...

duties of the pollution control agency. The Connecticut statute is
equally broad, directing the agency to "provide for the prevention
and abatement of all water, land and air pollution.

'5 2

All of the foregoing examples, however, confer authority essentially to prevent "pollution." The scope of any such rulemaking
power may thus be limited by a narrow definition of "pollution."
These definitions also affect the breadth of statutory prohibitions
against causing "pollution"; they are examined in a later section."
KY. REV. STAT. § 224.045(6)(b) (Supp. 1978); see id. § 224.033(17).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6010(a) (1975 & Supp. 1978).
5 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-6(1) (1977). This language, standing alone, may be subject to a crippling interpretation; past decisions have held that similar clauses confer no
substantive power. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comn'n, 483 F.2d 1238,
1254-57 (D.C. Cir. 1973); New England Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 467 F.2d 425,
430 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (clauses of "implementary rather than substantive character ...
merely augment existing powers conferred upon the agency by Congress, they do not confer
independent authority to act" (footnote omitted)), aff'd, 415 U.S. 345 (1974). But see Na48

49

tional Petroleum Refiners As'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (authority to
promulgate "rules and regulations [for the purpose of carrying out a section of the Trade
Commission Act] should be construed to permit the Commission to promulgate binding substantive rules as well as rules of procedure"). The Connecticut statute, however, precludes
such an interpretation by explicit reference to both "environmental standards" and "procedural regulations." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-5(e) (1977).
51 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6001(c)(2) (1975).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-5(e) (1977).
5' See Part H infra.
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In some states, moreover, an ostensibly broad grant of
rulemaking power is cut back by specific statutory limitations.
New Mexico, for example, limits its general grant of rulemaking
authority by a provision that no regulation may "specify the
method to be used" to avoid pollution.5 This restriction appears
to be motivated by legitimate desires to avoid monopolies and to
induce dischargers to seek efficient control methods. Unfortunately, it seems to make it impossible to prescribe work practices
to minimize pollution when absolute limitations on the amount of
emissions are impracticable, as in the control of asbestos in the
demolition of buildings.5 5 Ohio, more significantly, appends to an
otherwise general grant of rulemaking power the words "prescribing... emission standards for air contaminants, and other necessary regulations for the purpose of achieving and maintaining compliance with ambient air quality standards." 6 Perhaps it is only
"other necessary regulations" that are limited to achieving ambient
standards, but a comma is a weak reed in statutory construction.
Even at best, the only permissible regulations independent of air
quality are "emission standards."
It is common to embellish general rulemaking grants with lists
of specific types of regulations intended to be included, such as
explicit authorization for "standard[s] of performance for new
sources,

'5 7

or "standards of quality of the air and water."58 One of

the most extensive lists is found in Nevada, which supplements a
general authority with express references to "air quality standards," "emission control requirements," "fuel standards," and
"elimination of devices or practices which cannot be reasonably allowed without generation of undue amounts of air contaminants. ' '5 9 The evident purpose of such additions is to guard against
the risk that a court might hold the general rulemaking authority
less all-inclusive than it appears. Specification in turn creates the
risk that a court may invoke maxims such as inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius or ejusdem generis to cut down the scope of the
general grant, and of course it is impossible for a legislature to
foresee and to list every type of regulation that may prove useful.,0
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-4(D) (1979).

See 38 Fed. Reg. 8820, 8821 (1973).
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3704.03(E) (Page 1980).
17 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-4(D) (1979).
" MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-17-17(h) (Supp. 1979).
5, NEV. REV. STAT. § 445.461(1)-(2), (5), (8)-(9) (1979).
One example of the incompleteness of any such list is provided by Village of Lom-
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2. Specific Provisions. Some states, either by oversight or in
order to keep administrators under tighter control, avoid grants of
general rulemaking power and rely entirely upon lists specifying
the types of regulations that may be adopted. These lists typically
include air or water quality standards and emission or effluent
standards, and in some states they include nothing else."' The obvious risk in such statutes is the omission of useful types of regulations. For instance, even if the power to adopt ambient standards
implies implementing regulations directed toward dischargers,
there may be a place for discharge limitations not immediately related to ambient quality.6 2 Moreover, it is by no means clear that a
reference to "effiuent" or "emission" standards embraces limitations on the composition of process materials (such as the familiar
limits on sulfur in fuels or phosphate in detergents), much less the
various traffic control measures commonly employed to combat ve-

bard v. Pollution Control Bd., 66 Ill. 2d 503, 363 N.E.2d 814 (1977). The Illinois Supreme
Court held that the power to adopt "regulations to promote the purposes of this Title,"
including control of water pollution, hLL. RaV. STAT. ch. 111/2, 1013(a) (1979), did not
include regulations requiring consolidation of sewage treatment facilities. While the court
purported to recognize that the statutory listing of permissible regulations was not exclusive, it seems to have been heavily influenced by the absence of this specific type of regulation from the list.
61 E.g., Indiana, which empowers its stream pollution control board only to determine
what constitutes polluted water and to restrict "the polluting content" of any discharges,
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3-7 (Burns 1973); Georgia, where the only regulations authorized by
the water law are "effluent limitations" and "standards of water purity," GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-505 (Supp. 1980); and Kansas, which lists "ambient air quality standards" and "emission control requirements," KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3005(K), -3010 (Supp. 1979), as the only
permissible regulations under its air statute. The Kansas and Georgia statutes contain additional provisions that arguably take them out of the category we are now discussing. The
former authorizes "rules and regulations implementing and consistent with this act," id.
§ 65-3005(a), the latter those "necessary for the proper administration of this Chapter," GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-505(9) (Supp. 1980). But the bland wording of these general provisions and
the presence of separate provisions specifying ambient and discharge standards suggest that
the general language confers only procedural rulemaking authority and conveys no additional substantive powers. See note 50 supra.
6" See Currie, Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 457, 491-95. In some places there may be so
much clean air or water to dilute the discharge that ambient standards could be met without treatment. Yet ambient standards must be met in the future as well as today. "We
cannot allow present emission sources to use up the entire assimilative capacity of the air
without robbing the future of the opportunity for growth." Emission Standards, 4 Ill. P.C.B.
298, 309 (1972). In addition, there may be significant benefits in keeping the air or water
cleaner than ambient standards. Ambient standards are based on incomplete knowledge and
represent the worst level of pollution we are willing to tolerate rather than the optimum
level. It may therefore be desirable to prevent areas now clear from deteriorating to the level
of the ambient standard. Also, certain geographical areas may call for more protection than
necessary to meet the ambient standards on account of special esthetic or recreational
values.
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hicle pollution. 3 Nor is it clear that work practice requirements
are authorized as part of a power to adopt "emission standards.""
There is an enormous variety of substantive regulations that
are specifically authorized by one state or another. There are
special provisions authorizing administrative regulation of motor
vehicles, e5 fluorocarbons,e6 grain drying,67 particulates from the
processing of agricultural products,6 8 forest burning," mercury
emissions,7 0 and the open burning of field or turf grass for seed
production 1 or for agricultural purposes in general.71 Other laws
specifically authorize regulation of coal mine leaching,73 the nutrient or phosphate level in cleaning agents' the testing and use of
substances employed to clean up oil spills,/ and oil transfer, treatment, and disposal. 6
A few states authorize the creation of permit systems by regulation; in others, permit requirements are imposed directly by
statute.7
C.

Criteria to Guide Rulemaking

Statutory guidance for administrative determination of pollution standards is often nebulously general. Often the legislature essentially directs the agency to consider both the benefits and the
I

" For examples of such traffic control measures, see D. CURRIE, POLUMTON: CASES AND
M1TERxLs 363-79 (1975).
" See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 179 (1978), in which the Court
found one work practice requirement, the wetting of asbestos prior to building demolition,
not to be an emission standard.
"5 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-1771 to -1780 (Supp. 1979); NEY. REv. STAT. § 445.610.710 (1979). Both states provide for establishment of exhaust emission standards and inspection programs.
"MhcH. Com. LAws ANN. §§ 336.101-.107 (Supp. 1980).
47 MD. ANN. CODE

art. 43, § 693(d) (1980).

TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 3.10(e) (Vernon 1976).
" WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.94.660, .670 (1975).
70 Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.421-.423 (West 1979).
71 OR. REv. STAT. §§ 468.450-.495 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.94.656 (1975).
7' CAL. HEALTH & SASETY CODE § 41850 (West 1979); COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-7-123(b)
(Supp. 1979).
7' PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 35.691.315, .760.1 (Purdon 1977); id. § 32.5116 (Purdon
Supp. 1980).
' MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 323.231-.236 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.32(4) (West
Supp. 1980). The Michigan statute authorizes regulations to limit these levels but the Iowa
statute only allows regulations designed to publicize them.
78 CAL. WATER CODE § 13169 (West 1971).
76 MD. NAT. RsS. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1406 to -1411, -1417 (1974 & Supp. 1979). These
provisions dominate the entire Maryland water pollution statute.
7 See text and notes at notes 214-242 infra.
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costs of pollution control and then to achieve a reasonable balance
between them. A typically unhelpful example is Wyoming's air pollution formulation:
(b) In recommending such standards or requirements the
administrator shall:
(i) Consider all the facts and circumstances bearing
upon the reasonableness of the emissions involved,
including:
(A) The character and degree of injury to, or
interference with the health and physical well being
of the people, animals, wildlife and plant life;
(B) The social and economic value of the
source of pollution;
(C) The priority of location in the area
involved;
(D) The technical practicability and economic
reasonableness of reducing or eliminating the pollution; and
(E) The social welfare and aesthetic value.
(ii) Grant such time as he shall find to be reasonable
and necessary for owners and operators of air contaminant sources to comply with applicable standards or
requirements. 8
Other statutes instruct rulemakers to achieve standards necessary
to "a reasonable balance between total costs to the people and to
the economy, and the resultant benefits to the people";79 to "deal

with any matters deemed necessary and feasible for protecting the
environment or the health of the state";80 or "to maintain the purity of the air resource of the state, which shall be consistent with
protection of the public health and welfare and the public enjoyment thereof, physical property and other resources, flora and
fauna, maximum employment and full industrial development of
the state." 1
71 Wyo. STAT.
79 IOWA Con

§ 35-11-202 (1977).
ANN. § 455B.35 (West Supp. 1980).
So IDHO CODE § 39-107(8) (Supp. 1980).
81 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-1-1 (Burns 1973) (optimistically stating the competing considerations as absolutes); see id. § 13-1-1-4(3). See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-2-11
(1977) (water quality standards shall "protect the public health and welfare and the present
and prospective use of such waters for public water supplies, propagation of fish and aquatic

life and wildlife, recreational purposes and agricultural, industrial and other legitimate

1981]

State Pollution Statutes

Some statutes give even less guidance. For example, in South
Dakota the only criteria limiting an agency in setting effluent standards are that they must "include as a minimum all categories for
which the federal government has set standards" and "be at least
as stringent" as the federal standards.8 2 Presumably the board is to
attempt to carry out in its regulations the state's general statutory
policy "to conserve the waters of the state and to protect, maintain
and improve the quality thereof" for a variety of named uses;83 the
explicit inclusion of "agricultural, industrial, . . . and other legitimate uses" 84 ensures that the utility of water as a vehicle for waste
disposal will be given consideration. Rhode Island, probably the
extreme example of standardless delegation, simply authorizes
agency adoption of "standards of water quality" and "reasonable
rules and regulations for the prevention, control and abatement of
[water] 5pollution," without so much as a declaration of statutory
8
policy.
Any of the above formulations obviously leaves a great deal to
the judgment of the agency. This latitude is consistent with the
initial legislative decision that the subject is too complex and technical to make close legislative scrutiny practicable.
Sometimes, however, the statutory requirements are more confining. New Mexico, for example, authorizes "a standard of performance for new sources which reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction . . . achievable through application of the best
available demonstrated control technology, processes, operating
methods, or other alternatives." 6 New York prescribes that effluent limitations require at least "effective secondary treatment" of
all sanitary sewage before discharge.8 7 Maryland generally insists
that state and federal air quality standards be "identical" and that
emission standards be "no more restrictive than required to attain
and maintain the ambient air quality standards," except where
other federal standards are more stringent.8 8 Massachusetts reuses").
82 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 34A-2-13 (1977). The agency must perform the usual

balancing act to set ambient standards, see id. § 34A-2-11, quoted in note 81 supra.
'3 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34A-2-1 (1977).
sId.

, R.I. GEN. LAws § 46-12-3 (1971).
"N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-4(D) (1979).
87 N.Y. ENvnI CONSERv. LAW § 17-0509 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
" MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 693(b)(3), (6) (Supp. 1979). On request of local authorities,
however, stricter standards may be set. Id. § 693(b)(2).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[48:27

quires its administration, in adopting initial amendments to its implementation plan, to "postpone the achievement dates for the primary and secondary ambient air quality standards to the latest
'
dates permitted pursuant to federal law."89
The dominant theme in all of these more explicit requirements, however, is to conform state standards to the federal. The
common insistence that state standards be no less exacting than
federal requirements" is a predictable response to the availability
of federal grants for agencies that qualify to help administer the
federal program.9 1 A state's willingness to be a party to enforcing
regulations it has not determined to be reasonable seems highly
questionable policy, yet a refusal to go along would leave the affected polluter subject to federal enforcement and thus accomplish
little. More difficult to comprehend is the not infrequent command, as exemplified by the Massachusetts and Maryland statutes
just quoted, to be no more stringent than federal law. Federal requirements may well be excessively demanding in some instances,
but there is no reason to expect that standards expressing a nationwide minimum of pollution control will suffice for every case
and all extraordinary needs. It is bad enough that Congress all too
often forbids the states to adopt standards to protect their own
people; 92 for a state voluntarily to abdicate its own responsibility
in this manner is to punish the people in a fit of pique.
D.

Rulemaking Procedure

Most states require "public hearings" before the adoption of
substantive regulations. A typical statute provides for the promulgation of environmental standards "after proper study and after
conducting a public hearing upon due notice."9 3
In some states the hearing requirement is subject to exceptions or qualifications. Colorado requires hearings only in connection with some of the authorized regulations.9 4 In Kentucky hearings are held before an advisory committee that summarizes public
89 MAsS. ANN. LAWS
90

ch. 111, § 142(D) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975).

E.g., S.D. CODIFID LAWS ANN.

§

34A-2-13 (1977).

91 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1255, 1256, 1281 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7405 (Supp. II 1978).
92E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (Supp. IH1978) (prohibiting state emission standards for
new motor vehicles). See Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution:State Authority and Federal
Pre-Emption,68 MICH. L. REv. 1083 (1970).
93 S.C. CODE § 48-1-60 (1977).
" COLo. REv. STAT. §§ 25-8-205, -402 (1974 & Supp. 1979), which requires hearings to
set water quality standards but not to promulgate other regulations.
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response for the agency that actually promulgates rules.9 5 In
Alaska, while public proceedings are open to all interested parties,
oral statements may be limited at the discretion of the
department."8
Other states weaken their hearing requirements by providing
for less than comprehensive notice to the public. In Nevada notice
of the required hearing must be published only if "the regulation
provides a standard of water quality or waste discharge," and then
only "in a newspaper of general circulation in the area to which the
standard... will apply. 97 If the commission does no more than
this, many interested people will have no notice at all. New York's
water law demands a somewhat more sincere effort to provide a
meaningful hearing, by requiring notice by mail to "such other persons as the department has reason to believe may be affected by
the proposed standards."98
The Georgia and Kansas water pollution statutes contain no
provision for public participation in the adoption of regulations."
Fortunately, the omission is remedied by general statutes requiring
notice and a hearing before any state agency promulgates regulations. 10 0 Government in the dark comports poorly with the appearance of government for the people, and it creates serious risks of
error. Whether oral statements of position really add enough to
justify their inefficiency may be doubtful,10 1 but at the least the
states ought to disseminate broadly both the terms of and the justification for a proposed regulation, and solicit written responses.1 02
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.045(6) (Baldwin Supp. 1978).
ALAsKA STAT. § 44.62.210 (1976).
NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 445.207 (1977).

• N.Y. ENvm. CONSERV. LAW § 17-0301(10)(b) (McKinney 1973).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-501 to -530 (1971 & Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-161 to
-771 (Supp. 1979).
100 GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-104 (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-421 (Supp. 1979).
101 Oral statements of position have symbolic value in giving citizens a sense of participation through the opportunity to speak to the rulemaker face to face. Such statements may
also satisfy the fear that a written statement may either not be read or not be given sufficient attention. On the other hand, there is no assurance that the rulemaker will listen at
all, let alone more carefully than he would read a written submission. See Currie, Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 469-73.
101 This procedure was used by the Environmental Protection Agency in promulgating
effluent limitation guidelines under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The agency
characterized the process as "essential" to the promulgation of "sound" regulations. 38 Fed.
Reg. 21202 (1973). See Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Pr-ocedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401, 448-51 (1975). See also
Currie, Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 469-73 (describing the procedures used by the Illinois
Pollution Control Board).
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III. NUISANCE PROVISIONS
The heart of any program for administrative control of pollution is a delegation of authority to adopt regulations defining acceptable contaminant levels and practices. But no administrator
will be able to foresee and to provide in advance for all possible
pollution problems. Many legislatures accordingly have also enacted provisions outlawing "pollution" generally. The Nebraska
Environmental Protection Act is representative:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o cause pollution of
any air, waters or land of the state or to place or cause to be
placed any wastes in a location where they are likely to cause
103
pollution of any air, waters or land of the state ....
In many states, however, pollution control programs lack a catchall provision of this kind."" Moreover, Montana and South Dakota, while purporting to outlaw all water pollution, define it as
contamination in excess of that permitted by the regulations.10 5
This approach wholly fails to meet the need to control discharges
that fall outside existing regulations. In some states, independent
public-nuisance statutes may help to fill the gap. 08 Alternatively,
it may be possible for the administering agency to promulgate a
general prohibition against "pollution" under a broad grant of
rulemaking authority.10 7 Determining the true scope of a general
ban on pollution thus requires a close examination of the terms
used to define the ban.
103 NES. REV. STAT. § 81-1506 (Supp. 1978).
104

See, e.g., ARIZ.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§§ 36-770 to -971, -1700 to -1780 (1974 & Supp.

1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3001 to -3023 (1972 & Supp. 1979); MICH. Coum. LAWS ANN.
§§ 336.11-.36 (1975 & Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.01-.09, 116.01-.41 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 203.010-.195 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1980); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 75-2-101 to -429 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 445.131-.354, .401-.710 (1979);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-1-1 to -10, 74-6-1-13 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-24-1 to -26
(1978) (air); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-572 (1973); VA. CODE §§ 10-17.9:1-.23 (1978 &
Supp. 1980).
105S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-2-2(1), 34A-2-21 to -23 (1977); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §§ 75-5-103(5), -605 (1979).
'0"E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-801 to -807 (1978).
107 This occurred with respect to noise pollution in Illinois, where the Pollution Control
Board promulgated its own general nuisance provision. See Currie, Rulemaking, supra note

1, at 463-64. Such action in reliance on the general rulemaking authority, however, is vulner-

able to the charge that the legislature, by refusing to enact a statutory nuisance provision,
has determined that the agency should proceed only by adopting specific numerical

regulations.
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A.

The Interests Protected

Not all the existing statutory "pollution" prohibitions are
comprehensive. Nebraska, for instance, defines air pollution as
concentrations "injurious to human, plant, or animal life, or property, or the conduct of business." 10 8 This formulation at least arguably excludes mere interference with the quality of life.
More comprehensive, and fairly typical, are the following.
Connecticut defines air pollution as
the presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one or more air
pollutants or any combination thereof in such quantities and
of such characteristics and duration as to be, or be likely to
be, injurious to public welfare, to the health of human plant
or animal life, or to property, or as unreasonably
to interfere
09
with the enjoyment of life and property.2

The Washington definition of water pollution is:
such contamination, or other alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties, of any waters of the state, including change in temperature, taste, color, turbidity, or odor of
the waters, or such discharge of any liquid, gaseous, solid, radioactive, or other substance into any waters of the state as
will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters
harmful, detrimental or injurious to the public health, safety
or welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural,
recreational, or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other aquatic life. 110
Both of these formulations appear sufficiently broad in terms
of the interests they protect. "Legitimate beneficial uses" and "the
enjoyment of life or property" appear to be all-embracing even
without the additional interests listed for good measure. Obviously,
however, the breadth of protection actually afforded by this type
of statute depends upon subsidiary definitions of terms such as
"pollutants" and "waters."
B. The Pollutants Included
Most states appear to define "pollutant" or "contaminant"
10 NEB. REV. STAT.
l

§ 81-1502(2) (1976).

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

"o WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 19-505 (West 1977).
§ 90.48.020 (Supp. 1979).
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rather broadly. For example, Washington's references to "physical,
chemical or biological" alteration and to "any liquid, gaseous,
solid, radioactive, or other substance" seem to leave very little
room for accidental omission. Hawaii uses "substances" in its air
pollution definition, coupled with a list that is expressly not exclusive: "smoke, charred paper, dust, soot, grime, carbon, noxious
acids, fumes, gases, odors, particulate matter, or any combination
of these."11 1
Some states go to great lengths in their desire to be inclusive.
The Georgia law, classifying "solid or liquid particulate matter,
dust, fumes, gas, mist, smoke, or vapor or any matter or substance
either physical, chemical, biological, radioactive. . . or any combination or [sic] any of the above" as air contaminants,112 seems a
needlessly obscure way to refer to anything solid, liquid, or gaseous. Ohio defines water pollution as "the placing of any sewage,
industrial waste, or other wastes in any waters of the state" and
then provides definitions of the key terms: "sewage" is any substance containing "discharge[s] from the bodies of human beings
or animals"; "industrial waste" comes from "any process of industry, manufacture, trade, or business, or from the development,
processing or recovery of any natural resource"; "other wastes" are
"garbage, refuse, decayed wood, sawdust, shavings, bark, and other
wood debris, lime, sand, ashes, offal, night soil, oil, tar, coal dust,
or silt, [and] other substances that are not sewage or industrial
waste." ' The point of all this specification is unclear; the final
reference to "other substances" appears to make the rest
redundant.
Doubtful cases under general references to "substances" or to
"liquid, gaseous, and solid" matter include odors, radiation, and
thermal pollution. In some cases, special provision is made for
these problem areas.11 4 A court not disposed to sabotage the evidently all-encompassing legislative intent, however, can easily reason that odors are smelly molecules, that radiation is radioactive
particles, and that thermal pollution is usually the addition of hot
water. Amending the definition of pollutants to include a reference
to energy would help to avoid possible oversights.
m HAWAn REv. STAT. § 342-21 (1976).
GA. CODE ANN. § 43-2704(l)(a) (Supp. 1979).
.. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 6111.01 (Page 1977).
'" E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3-16 (Burns 1973); MIss. CODE ANN. § 49-17-5(0 (Supp.
1979).
'
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Sometimes there are explicit omissions from the definition.
Some states exclude steam and water vapor, 115 apparently ignoring
the possibility that manmade fog might interfere, for example,
with transportation. The "application of any materials to land for
agricultural purposes or run-off of such materials from such application" and "[t]he excrement of domestic and farm animals defecated on land or run-off therefrom into any waters of the state"1 1
are excepted from the Ohio definition.
C.

The Resource Protected

Connecticut's reference to "the outdoor atmosphere 111 is
fairly common; a number of states employ similar language to
avoid conflict with industrial hygiene and "Clean Indoor Air" statutes."' "Air" and "atmosphere" are used interchangeably to denote the resource being protected. Either term appears to be sufficiently inclusive.
The definitions of "waters" are more variable. Some are very
general, like the Louisiana statute, which includes "rivers, streams,
lakes, groundwaters, and all other water courses and waters within
the confines of the state, and all bordering waters and the Gulf of
Mexico." 1 " The definitions, however, may leave three critical questions unresolved: whether "waters" include those underground,
those privately owned, or those artificially created. Some statutes
explicitly include all three categories. 20 Others make express exceptions. Cooling reservoirs, sewers, and treatment plants are frequently excluded,"2 for reasons that are obvious. One does not
wish to outlaw the cleaning of polluted water prior to its discharge.
E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-2(1), (3) (1976); Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-103(b)(i) (1977).
n OHIO RED. CODE ANN. § 6111.04(C), (D) (Page Supp. 1979).
n, CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. § 19-505 (West 1977), quoted in text at note 109 supra.

215

1KB See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116.06(3) (West 1977) (defining "air pollution" as contamination of "outdoor" air). See also id. §§ 144.411-.417 (West Supp. 1979) (Clean Indoor
Air Act).
"I LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1093(5) (West Supp. 1980).
120 ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.900(22) (1977); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1851(16) (Supp.
1979) (adding, apropos of the state's desert character, that waters "perennial or intermittent" also are included); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1902(9) (1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2554(b) (West Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 39-103(9) (Supp. 1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2,
1 1003(o) (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.30(9) (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 115.01(9) (West 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1502(21) (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1413.213(20) (1978); S.C. CODE § 48-1-10(2) (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34A-2-2(6)
(1977).
1
COLO. REy. STAT. § 25-8-103(16) (1974); HAwAI REV. STAT. § 342-31 (1976); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 926.1(6) (West Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-2(e) (Supp. 1980).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[48:27

Another common exemption is for waters on private land that do
not "effect a junction with natural. . . waters," 12 2 especially where
there is a single owner. 2 The exclusion apparently is based on the
theory that in that case no one is hurt but the polluter himself.
Some states go even further, and exempt all privately owned
ponds,12 4 farm ponds, 25 or landlocked private surface waters.12 6
One danger in this type of exemption is that pollution of private
waters may affect public waters with which they connect, but a
properly worded prohibition on the pollution of public waters
might prevent that. A more important objection to any exclusion
of privately owned waters is that some states that have such exemptions appear to make no effort to protect part-owners from
depredations by their fellows. 27
Artificial waters do not appear to have been specifically exempted by any state, but statutes silent on the subject 2 8 are susceptible to narrow interpretation. Apart from the independent issue of private ownership, there is no obvious reason to think there
is less need to protect the quality of artificial than of natural
waters.
The importance of protecting groundwater should be obvious,
and almost all states specifically include it in the definitions of
state waters. 2 e Some states even go so far as specifically to ban all
I" N.Y. ENviR. CONSERV. LAW § 17-0105(2) (McKinney 1973); accord, N.D. CENT.CODE
61-28-02(6) (Supp. 1979); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 6111.01(H) (Page 1977); OR. REV. STAT.
468.700(8) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-326(cc) (Supp. 1979). See also ME. RFv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38, § 361-A(7) (1978) (language to same effect); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-2(G) (1977)

§
§

(same).

' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.031(3) (West 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-503(d) (Supp. 1979);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 361-A(7) (1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.016(15) (Vernon Supp.
1980) (excluding waters on private land owned by tenants in common); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 70-326(cc) (Supp. 1979). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 147.015(13) (West 1974) (excluding
waters owned by "a person"--a term defined by id. § 147.015(1) to include, inter alia, a
municipal corporation).
1"4 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3-16 (Burns 1973).
'2, W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-2(e) (Supp. 1979).
116 MIss. CODE ANN. § 49-17-5(f) (Supp. 1979).
127 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-3-1 to -16 (Burns 1973).
118 E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-8-103(16) (1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6002(7), (22)

(1975); HAWAn REV. STAT. § 342-31 (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3-16 (Burns 1973); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 361-A(7) (West 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21, § 26A (Michie/
Law. Co-op Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.016(15) (Vernon Supp. 1980); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 75-5-103(9) (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 149.1(V), (VII) (1978); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 74-6-2-(G) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-326(cc) (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1251(7) (1973); VA. CODE § 62.1-10(a) (1973); Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-103(c)(vi) (1977).
129 E.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13050 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-103 (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.031 (West 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.010 (Vernon 1972).
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pollution of either surface or ground waters, rather than banning
pollution of water generally and including ground waters within
the definition.1 3 0 These are wise precautions, because a definition
merely listing such terms as "rivers, lakes, and streams" would invite the unfortunate invocation of ejusdem generis to exclude
serious detriment, flatly limits
groundwater. Rhode Island, to 13its
1
its definition to surface waters.
D. The Relevance of Cost, Intent, and Negligence
The Connecticut statute quoted above is typical in defining air
pollution as "unreasonabl[e]" interference with the enjoyment of
life and property.13 2 Such language should make it clear that the
prohibition is not absolute. Commendably, the cost of abatement is
to be balanced against the harm caused by contamination. Many
pollution provisions, however, are not so restrained. West Virginia,
for example, forbids any discharge into the air that "would interfere with the enjoyment of life or property."13 3 In water pollution
statutes, absolute terminology such as Washington's prohibition of
anything "harmful... to...
legitimate beneficial uses" is standard.1 34 Even Connecticut's air statute appears to impose an absolute ban on emissions harmful to "health" or to "property" as contrasted with their "enjoyment." Furthermore, the inclusion of
"public welfare" in the category of interests absolutely protected
may subsume "enjoyment" cases and render the unreasonableness
clause irrelevant. Moreover, in Illinois the state supreme court construed the term "unreasonably" in a definition generally similar to
Connecticut's to mean "substantial. ' 13 5 In all these instances the
definition of pollution is so broad that it creates the risk that million-dollar enterprises may be shut down to avoid trivial harm.
Many statutes, however, provide relief for such cases through
variance or enforcement provisions expressly acknowledging the

130

3

E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7,

R.L GEN. LAWS

§ 6003(a)

(1974).

§ 46-12-1 (1971). Vermont also defines "waters" to mean surface

waters only. VT. STAT. ANN.tit. 10, § 1251(7) (1973). It adds a separate provision, however,

directing its agency to control "groundwater resources," although it does not define the
term. Id. §§ 1278-1279 (Supp. 1980).
11 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 19-505 (West 1977), quoted in text at note 109 supra.
"
134

W. VA. CODE § 16-20-2 (1972).
WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 90.48.020 (Supp. 1980).

"' Processing & Books, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 64 IMI.2d 68, 77, 351 N.E.2d 865,
869 (1976) (construing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1003(b) (1979)).
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relevance of cost. 3 6 In other states, industry has escaped a general
shutdown despite apparently absolute provisions, presumably
through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Unbridled discretion, however, invites abuse; it would be preferable explicitly to
make consideration of abatement costs necessary in determining
the existence of a violation. Care should be taken, however, to
place the burden of cost justification on the polluter, who has better access to information about his own costs. The insertion of
"unreasonable" or the like in the definition of pollution has an unfortunate tendency to lead to a requirement that the plaintiff show
137
that the costs are not excessive before a violation will be found.
The typical statute does not require that the pollution be intentionally or negligently caused in order to constitute a violation. 3 8 There are some exceptions to this general pattern. Arkansas prohibits only knowing pollution of waters,13 9 providing no
incentive to take precautions against accidental spills. Tennessee
more reasonably excepts only "unavoidable accident,"14 0 thus preserving the incentive. In practice, the effect of a provision allowing
consideration of abatement costs may be equivalent to a requirement of negligence.""
E. Actual and Threatened Pollution
A final dimension of these general pollution bans is that they
often lack any prophylactic clause enabling the state to prevent
prospective pollution. For example, Nebraska's provision makes it
unlawful only to "cause" pollution; 42 except under a separate provision limited to "emergenc[ies],' ' 4 3 no complaint may be issued
until a violation already "has occurred.' 44 The problem may be
alleviated in Nebraska by a broad prohibition on construction or
operation of any emission source without a permit from the state
156 E.g., ALA. CODE ANN.§ 22-28-13 (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42352 (1979);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6011 (1975); HAWAn REV. STAT. § 342-7 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
11112,
1035 (1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 77.260 (1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116.07(5) (West
1977); NEv. REV. STAT. § 445.506 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8 (1977); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3704.03(H) (Page Supp. 1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 468.345 (1979).
IS See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 460-63.
I" See, e.g., NEB.Rzv. STAT. § 81-1506 (Supp. 1978), quoted in text at note 103 supra.
139 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1938(a) (1976).
1o TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-336 (Supp. 1979).
141 See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 407-11.
141 NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1506 (Supp. 1978), quoted in text at note 103 supra.
143 NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1507(4) (1976).
144 Id. § 81-1507(1).
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pollution control agency,1 45 coupled with a provision directing the
agency to issue a prohibitory order if it determines that a permit
applicant will not conform to the statute.1 " The Connecticut and
Washington definitions of "pollution" quoted above147 permit a
certain degree of prediction as to the effect of a discharge by including conditions "likely to be" harmful. Yet these definitions
still require that the discharge itself begin before legal action can
be taken. It would be preferable to prohibit the threat as well as
the actual occurrence of pollution.4 '
IV.

VARIANCES

Regulations that are reasonable for most polluters may impose
unjustifiable burdens on individual firms because of special circumstances. It is therefore common in pollution control statutes, as
in zoning laws, to provide a safety valve in the form of "variances,"
"exemptions," "waivers," "suspensions," or "temporary permits"
1 49
allowing deviations from generally applicable requirements.
Idaho, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin
make no explicit provision for variances in either their air or water
pollution statutes;1 50 many other states make no provision for
water pollution variances. 15 1 Theoretically, this is a grave oversight
that could unjustly force a firm out of business. Yet the substantive equivalent of a variance may often be possible under statutory
enforcement provisions. An agency that finds a violation is to issue
"such ... order . . . as it shall deem appropriate under the circumstances" in Idaho; 52 "such order as . . . will best further the
purposes" of the statute in Mississippi;"' and an order to comply

145

Id. § 81-1506(2) (Supp. 1978).

Id. § 81-1506(3). Unfortunately, the order is to prohibit only "construction, installation or establishment" of the source; the section seems not to apply to existing sources.
147 See text at notes 109-110 supra.
'8 See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 402-03.
141 For examples, see text and notes at notes 158-192 infra.
250 IDAHO CODE §§ 39-101 to -119 (1977 & Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-17-1 to
's

-43 (1973 & Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2C-1 to -36 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980) (air);
id. §§ 58.10A-1 to -14 (West Supp. 1980) (water); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW §§ 1-0101 to
19-0711 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.30-.57 (West 1974 & Supp.
1978) (air); id. §§ 147.01-.30 (water).
151 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-8-101 to -612 (1974 & Supp. 1978); NEV. REv. STAT.
§§ 445.131-.354 (1979).
151 IDAHO CODE § 39-108(4) (1977).
153 Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-17-31(b) (Supp. 1979).
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within a "reasonable specified time" in New Jersey. 54 Hardship
could lead an agency to mitigate the literal requirements of the
applicable standards under any of these provisions. New York explicitly requires its pollution control agency to consider "the adequacy and practicability of various means of complying" and the
polluter's "financial ability" to do so; if that consideration leads to
the conclusion that "immediate compliance would be impossible or
impractical," the polluter is to be given a "reasonable time" to take
"the required steps." 155 It seems likely that in other states,
prosecutorial discretion will fill the need for flexibility. 156 Again,
such discretion invites abuse. Additionally, an explicit variance
procedure offers significant practical advantages: an advance determination of legality so that the discharger need not violate the
rules to find out his rights, and a public proceeding permitting
presentation of conflicting views and ensuring public evaluation of
administrative decisions. 15 7 Some type of variance mechanism is
therefore highly desirable.
A.

The Enabling Clause

Many of the states that authorize variances have basic provisions similar to Alabama's: "The commission may grant individual
variances beyond the limitations prescribed in this chapter whenever it is found, upon presentation of adequate proof, that compliance with any rule or regulation, requirement or order of the commission would impose serious hardship without equal or greater
benefits to the public. . . .""' In short, the commission is to balance the costs and benefits of compliance.1 59
Common phrases such as "serious hardship without equal or
I4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:2C-14 (West 1973).
151 N.Y. ENvin. CONSERV. LAw § 19-0509(3) (McKinney 1973).
156 It did so in Illinois before there was a provision for water variances. See Act of July
12, 1951, 1951 11. Laws 1462 (repealed 1970).
1'7 See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 468-69.
1" ALA. CODE § 22-28-13(a) (1977).
159 A similar approach was taken in Hawaii, which requires that a variance be given
only when "[t]he continuation of the function or operation involved in the discharge of
waste by the granting of the variance is in the public interest," HAWAII REv. STAT. § 3427(c)(1) (1976), which in turn is to be determined so as to secure the "optimum balance
between economic development and environmental quality." Id. § 342-6(c) (Supp. 1980).
Other states specify that the competing interests to be considered are those of the applicant,
of other property owners likely to be affected by the discharge, and of the general public.
E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 445.506(2) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8(B) (1979); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 561(b) (1973); WASH. Rzv. CODE ANN. § 70.94.181(b)(2) (1975).
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greater benefits"16 0 suggest that a polluter can obtain a variance
whenever he can demonstrate that control costs are marginally
greater than the less easily measured harm done by allowing the
pollution. But to determine de novo in every case whether compliance is a good thing is to nullify the administrative benefits of
adopting general regulations. In contrast, the Illinois statute
authorizes variances only when compliance would "impose an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship. 16 1 The state Pollution Control
Board has construed this to mean that "a variance is to be granted
only in those extraordinary situations in which the cost of compliance is wholly disproportionate to the benefits; doubts are to be
resolved in favor of denial. 1 62 This approach should keep the variance process manageable.
Several states that employ the "equal" public benefits test
substitute more demanding terms for "serious hardship." The air
pollution control law in Kentucky, for example, allows a variance
[i]f the hearing board finds that because of conditions beyond,
control compliance... will result in an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property or in the practical closing and
elimination of any lawful business, occupation or activity, in
either case without a sufficient corresponding benefit or ad16 3
vantage to the people in the reduction of air contamination.
The use of "unreasonable" suggests that the Kentucky standard is
similar to the Illinois position, but closer inspection reveals significant differences. On the one hand, Kentucky allows a variance
whenever the cost of closing a business outweighs the benefits,
without requiring that the cost be unreasonable; on the other,
Kentucky does not allow a variance unless a business is closed or a
"taking" of property occurs, even if the costs of compliance are
unreasonable when compared with the benefits.'" The use of the
phrase "because of conditions beyond control" in a number of stat-

I"o There

also are alternatives, such as those referring to "corresponding benefit," CAL.

HEALTH & SAMEY CODE § 42352 (West 1979), and to "sufficient corresponding benefit or
advantage to the people," Ky. Rzv. STAT. § 77.260(1) (1971).
161 ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 111 h, 1 1035 (1979).

EPA v. Lindgren Foundry Co., 1 IlM. P.C.B. 11, 16-17 (1970). Minnesota's reference
to "undue hardship" in its variance clause, MNN. STAT. ANN. § 116.07(5) (West 1977), is
susceptible to the same interpretation.
162 Ky. Rav. STAT. § 77.260(1) (1970).
16 These drawbacks led to the abandonment of a nearly identical formulation in an
earlier Illinois air pollution law. See Air Pollution Control Act § 11(a), 1963 M11.
Laws 3198
(repealed 1970).
12
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utes, such as Kentucky's, seems to import an appropriate requirement of good faith, which has also been found to be implicitly relevant to the interpretation of "unreasonable hardship" in Illinois."'
Oregon departs from the standard form by listing the particular hardships that justify a variance:
The commission shall grant such specific variance only if it
finds that strict compliance with the rule or standard is inappropriate because:
(a) Conditions exist that are beyond the control of the persons granted such variance; or
(b) Special circumstances render strict compliance unreasonable, burdensome or impractical due to special physical conditions or cause; or
(c) Strict compliance would result in substantial curtailment
or closing down of a business, plant or operation; or
(d) No other alternative facility or method of handling is yet
available." 6
There is an obvious danger that some types of real hardships may
be inadvertently omitted from such a list, making it impossible for
a deserving firm to obtain a variance.
Some states impose other limits on the balancing process. In
North Carolina, for instance, variances are authorized only if
"[tihe discharge of waste or emission of air contaminants occurring
or proposed to occur do [sic] not endanger human health or
safety. 16 7 Health and safety are given absolute protection. We do
not forbid all driving that endangers human life, however, for the
costs would be too great. Similarily, absolute health protection in a
pollution statute entails the risk that a significant portion of industry would be closed down. A few states carry absolute protection
See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 420-26.
O& REV. STAT. § 468.345 (1979).
167N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.3(e)(1) (Supp. 1979). Other statutes with comparable re"e

strictions include HAwAIi REv. STAT. § 342-7 (Supp. 1979) (no variance if pollution would
"substantially endanger human health or safety"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3013 (Supp. 1979)
(no variance where pollution would "endanger or tend significantly to endanger human
health or safety"); NEV. REv. STAT. § 445.506 (1977) (no variance if "human" health or
safety would be endangered); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8 (1979) (no variance if pollution
endangers or tends to endanger "health or safety"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 561 (1973) (no
variance if "human" health or safety would be endangered); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.94.181 (1975) (no variance if "public" health or safety would be endangered). But cf.
NEB.REV. STAT. § 81-1513 (1976) (variance may be granted if emissions "do not endanger or
tend to endanger human health or safety or ... compliance ...
would produce serious
hardship without equal or greater benefits to the public") (emphasis added).
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even beyond health and safety, making variances nearly impossible
to obtain. For example, Alabama forbids variances unless "the
emissions occurring, or proposed to occur, do not endanger or tend
to endanger human health or safety, human comfort and aesthetic
1 68
values."

Most states provide for variances from the pollution control
statutes themselves as well as from the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder.6 9 Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio,

Utah, and Vermont, however, do not allow relief from the statutory
provisions. 170 This omission may be unintentional, as is the case in
Illinois. 17 1 It probably makes little difference in the case of the
Ohio air pollution control program, where almost every prohibition
is to be set in motion only at the discretion of the agency. 17 2 In a
less flexible system 7 3 the omission is troublesome.
I" ALA. CODE § 22-28-13(a) (1977). South Carolina, parroting a federal provision since
repealed, authorizes its agency to grant variances when it determines that
(1) good faith efforts have been made to comply with such requirement before such
date;
(2) such source (or class) is unable to comply with such requirement because the necessary technology or other alternative methods of control are not reasonably available or have not been available for a sufficient period of time;
(3) any available alternative operating procedure and interim control measures have
reduced or will reduce the impact of such source on public health;
(4) the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or to the
public health or welfare.
S.C. CODE § 48-1-140(b) (Supp. 1979); accord, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f)(1) (1976) (repealed
1977), criticized in Currie, FederalAir-Quality Standardsand Their Implementation, 1976
Am.BAR FoUNAnoN RESEARCH J. 365, 380-81. This statute responds poorly to the competing interests. Evidently there can be no variance, however great the hardship, unless the
source is "essential." No comparison of the hardship of compliance with the harm of allowing the variance is required or allowed. In addition, the provision permits variances only
from enforcement orders; thus in South Carolina variances cannot serve to clarify obligations in advance of prosecution.
148 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.201 (West Supp. 1980); Ky. REv. STAT. § 77.245 (1970).
170 IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.22 (West Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3013 (Supp.
1979); NEn. REv. STAT. § 81-1513 (1976); NEV. REv. STAT. § 445.506 (1979); OHIO REV.CODE
ANN. § 3704.03(H) (Page Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-11(5) (1976); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 561 (1973).
171 See IhL. Rav. STAT. ch. 1111/2, 1 1035 (1979). The unintentional exclusion of the
statutory provisions is described in Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 408-09.
172 See OHIO Ray. CODE ANN. § 3704.03 (Page Supp. 1980) ("director of environmental
protection may... issue ... orders prohibiting or abating emissions") (emphasis added).
17S Iowa is an example. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.10-.29 (West Supp. 1980). "The
commission shall ... consider complaints ... issue orders ... [and] cause to be instituted

by the attorney general.., legal proceedings to compel compliance ..
(emphasis added).

"

Id. § 455B.12
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B. Conditions
The terms of a variance may simply be left to the discretion of
the granting agency, as in Pennsylvania, 174 or they may be dictated
by statute. One example is the Florida Air and Water Pollution
Control Act, which provides that a "temporary operating permit"
granted for traditional variance considerations shall:
1. Specify the manner, nature, volume, and frequency of the
discharge permitted;
2. Require the proper operation and maintenance of any interim or temporary pollution abatement facility or system required by the department as a condition of the permit;
3. Require the permit holder to maintain such monitoring
equipment and make and file such records and reports as the
department deems necessary to insure compliance with the
terms of the permit and to evaluate the effects of the discharge upon the receiving waters;
4. Be valid only for the period of time necessary for the permit holder to place into operation the facility, system, or
method contemplated in his application as determined by the
department; and
5. Contain other requirements and restrictions which the department deems necessary and desirable to protect the quality
17 5
of the receiving waters and promote the public interest.
Most states have provided some degree of statutory direction as to
the terms of a variance between these two extremes. 17 8
Even the least structured statutes are almost certain to have a
provision requiring a time limitation as a condition of the variance.
A number of states limit all variances to one year but make them
subject to renewal. 177 Others set three possible time limitations,
each dependent upon the reason for variance. 7 The New Mexico
174
175
176

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4013.5(a) (Purdon 1977).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.088(4)(d) (West
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.22

1973).
(West Supp. 1980); OHIO

Ray. CODE ANN.

§ 3704.03(H) (Page Supp. 1980).
177 E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-28-13(c) (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 77.270 (1970); MICH. Com'.
LAws ANN. § 366.32 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.03(H) (Page Supp. 1980); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1802(J)(d) (West Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-15(c) (1968);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-3415(C)(8) (1977). South Dakota's water pollution law is something

of an aberration in that it requires that a variance be "reviewed" every two years. S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
178 ALASKA STAT.
REV. STAT.

§ 34A-2-26 (1977).
§ 46.03.170(c) (1977); KAN.

§ 81-1513(3) (1976); NEv.

REv. STAT.

§ 65-3013(c) (Supp. 1979); NEB.
§ 445.516(1) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74STAT. ANN.
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statute, for example, provides that:
(1) if the variance is granted on the ground that there is no
practicable means known or available for the adequate prevention, abatement or control of the air pollution involved, it
shall be only until the necessary means for prevention, abatement or control become known and available;
(2) if the variance is granted on the ground that compliance
with the particular requirement or requirements from which
the variance is sought will necessitate the taking of measures
which, because of their extent or cost, must be spread over a
considerable period of time, it shall be for a period not to
exceed such reasonable time as, in the view of the board, is
requisite for the taking of necessary measures... ;
(3) if the variance is granted on the ground that it is justified to relieve or prevent hardship of a kind other than that
provided for in Paragraphs (1) or (2) of this subsection, it
shall be for not more than one year.179
The two exceptions to the one-year limitation appear sensible at
first glance. The first, however, is poorly executed, since additional
time will be needed to install equipment after it becomes "known
and available." Furthermore, while annual renewals may increase
administrative costs, they also help to ensure that the agency
monitors continuing progress.
Almost all states statutorily allow or require pollution control
agencies to attach to variances conditions that serve as alternatives
for the regulation being set aside. In Michigan, for example,
[t]he commission shall consider the reasonableness of granting
a variance conditioned upon the person effecting a partial
control of the particular air pollution or progressive control of
the air pollution over a period of time which it considers reasonable under all the circumstances; or the commission may
prescribe other and different reasonable regulations with
which the person receiving the variance shall comply. 80
While this power may be implicit in general variance provisions

2-8 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-1-31 to -33 (1977) (air pollution variances); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 561(c) (1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.94.181(3) (1975); Wyo. STAT.
§ 35-11-601(b), (c), (e) (1977).
17° N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8 (1979).
'" MICH. Cjmw. LAws ANN. § 366.30 (1975).
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that do not specifically grant it,181 the inclusion of such a clause
increases the probability that a variance will not be a simple icense to pollute, but rather a blueprint for compliance as soon as
practicable.
The Illinois provision requiring posting of a performance
bond, 182 which I have discussed elsewhere, 183 is an effort to create a
financial incentive toward living up to variance conditions. The
effectiveness of such an incentive depends, of course, upon the
willingness of the responsible officials to enforce forfeiture.
C.

Variance Procedure

Many states, though not all, provide for administrative hearings upon variance applications.1 8 4 The statutory formulas vary. A
hearing may be required before a variance can be granted, 18 5 or
before one can be denied.18s Special provisions sometimes require
hearings for renewal, revocation, or modification of existing
18 7

variances.

It seems clear that in general a quasi-judicial hearing is a helpful means of ascertaining the facts relevant to the grant or denial

of a variance. Furthermore, if a pollution statute creates a substanAn example is S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34A-1-30 (1977).
REv. STAT. ch. 111Y2,
1036 (1979).
'83 Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 471.
18 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-28-13(d) (1977) (requiring notice of petition in newspaper
181

1s2 ILL.

of general circulation, but allowing grant of variance without hearing unless commission
considers hearing advisable, or "any person" files written objection to the variance); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-1939 (1976) (no hearing required when director recommends grant of variance, except on petition of person aggrieved by such grant); Ky. REv. STAT. § 77.250 (1975)
(providing that board "may" hold hearing on own motion or request of any person); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8(D) (1979) (requiring a hearing when director recommends granting the
variance, and also on request of petitioner when board opposes the variance); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 3704.03(H) (Page Supp. 1980) (providing that director "may" hold hearing);
TrNN. CODE AN. § 53-3415(c) (1977) (hearing required only if technical secretary opposed
variance, and if board concludes hearing is "advisable"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-11(5)
(1976) (requiring a public "meeting"). Cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 34A-1-24 to -27
(1977) (no specific provision for variance hearings).
19 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.170 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 561(b) (1973); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.94.181(1) (1975).
1" E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 203.110(4), 204.061(5) (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1980); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 53-3415(c) (1977); TEX. Rlv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 3.22(d) (Vernon
1976) (hearing required only if requested by local government or if pollution control agency
concludes it is advisable).
168 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-1939 (1976) (hearing required before variance can be
denied, revoked, or modified); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 336.33 (1975) (hearing required for
revocation, although no hearing required for grant of variance, id. § 336.31); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 468.345(5) (1979) (hearing required before revocation or modification).
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tive right in the polluter to obtain relief upon meeting prescribed
criteria, contemporary Supreme Court opinions strongly suggest
that the polluter has a property interest within the protection of
the due process clause, and that he is entitled to a quasi-judicial
hearing if his allegations state a claim on which relief can be
granted.1 88 Although the grant of a variance may adversely affect
the polluter's neighbors, it seems unlikely that they are given any
comparable property interest by a pollution control statute.1 8 9
Whether they can require a hearing therefore seems to be up to the
state legislature or its delegate, the control agency.
As a policy matter, a hearing seems desirable whenever there
is any substantial room for doubt over the facts, even if no one has
requested it. This conclusion follows from the frequent absence of
any genuine adversary to the variance applicant: neighbors who
will be harmed by the grant of a variance often do not make an
appearance to contest it. The first obstacle is to notify them. They
may be too numerous to make personal notice practicable-an entire city may be affected-and a legal notice in the back pages of a
newspaper is likely to go largely unread. Illinois has tried to mitigate the problem by giving personal notice to those who have requested notice of variance applications in their vicinity,1 90 but even
this practice is certain to leave many who would be injured by the
requested variance uninformed.
Moreover, notice is only the first difficulty. Often those who
know of and would be individually harmed by the grant of a variance application will not find it worth the effort to mount a case in
opposition, even if the aggregate effect of the variance would be
considerable. One common response to this problem is to give a
government agency the responsibility to investigate the facts and
to present a recommendation to those empowered to pass on the
variance.191 Illinois experience 9 2 suggests this is a useful expedient
but not the equivalent of a true adversary process. Among other

16 See Currie, The Mobile-Source Provisions of the Clean Air Act, 46 U. CHi. L. Rv.
811, 844-45 (1979). Like the applicant for bar admission, see Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), and the welfare recipient, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), the polluter claims an "entitlement" that would seem to constitute a property interest protected by the due process clause.
186 See League of Women Voters v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 1111. P.C.B. 576 (1971).
1,0 ILL. REv. STAT. ch 112, 111037 (1979).
"
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-28-13(d) (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1939 (1976); ILL.
Rv. STAT. ch. 1111/2, 1 1037 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8(D) (1979); TkNN. CODE ANN.
§ 53-3415(i) (1977).
19' See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 468-75.
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things, the recommending agency properly feels that its responsibility is to advocate the outcome best for society as a whole; the
arguments of the victims of the variance, therefore, may never be
presented to those making the decision. A requirement that an applicant for a variance prove that the cost of compliance significantly outweighs the benefits would be an additional safeguard for
the interests of absent victims.
V.

A.

ENFORCEMENT

Cease-and-Desist Orders

The basic mechanism for enforcement of the pollution laws is
the administrative order to cease and desist from violations of the
statute or regulations. Cease-and-desist authority apparently exists
in every air or water pollution program. 19 3 The advantages of administrative rather than judicial enforcement include the value of
experience with complex technical issues, the possibility of more
expeditious proceedings, the elimination of disparity in interpretation, the avoidance of congestion in the regular courts, and, not
least, the possibility of appointing personnel sympathetic to the
194
goals of the program.
As one would expect, a hearing normally precedes issuance of
a cease-and-desist order, and it generally resembles a judicial
trial.195 Most states authorize issuance of orders without a prior
hearing in an emergency. 96 Most, but not all, of these require a
hearing within a specified time after issuance of an emergency or193 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-7 (1975); HAwAH RE V. STAT. § 342-8 (1976).
In the District of Columbia the pollution control agency is not explicitly given the authority
to issue cease-and-desist orders. It is, however, authorized to "issue such orders as may be
necessary to enforce the regulations... and enforce such orders by all appropriate administrative and judicial proceedings, including injunctive relief." D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 6813(b)(2) (West Supp. 1970). This language appears to include cease-and-desist orders.
19 Cf. Currie & Goodman, JudicialReview of Federal Administrative Action: Quest
for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. Ray. 1, 62-74 (1975) (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of specialized courts for review of administrative action).
195 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/,
1031-1033 (1979) (providing for pleadings,
representation by counsel, cross-examination, stenographic transcription, and written opinions); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 336.20 (West 1975) (providing for pleadings, counsel, compulsory process, testimony under oath, and recording of testimony).
1" E.g., CoLo. Ray. STAT. §§ 25-7-112 to -113 (Supp. 1979); IowA CODE ANN. § 455B.18
(West Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125:84
(1978); N.Y. ENVm. CONsEnv. LAW § 71-0301 (McKinney Supp. 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3704.032 (Page 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-11(4) (1976).
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der;197 due process probably requires that a hearing take place as
soon as practicable.198 A number of states provide an additional
safeguard against abuse of the emergency power by requiring that
such orders be issued or approved by the Governor.19'
To obtain sanctions for the violation of an administrative order, it is necessary in most states to go to court. 00 This two-step
process can delay enforcement and weaken the agency, especially
in the extreme case in which a court may examine the order de
novo.2 01 Often, however, judicial review is limited to whether the

agency acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence.2 03 This traditional standard of appellate re1'7 Colorado, New Hampshire, and Ohio, for example, make no mention either of time
or of a hearing. COLO. Rxv. STAT. §§ 25-7-112 to -113 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 125:84 (1978); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3704.032 (Page 1980). A number of states require
hearings within 24 hours. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012 (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 26-24-11(4) (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 560 (1973). In contrast, Nebraska allows 10
days before the hearing, NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1507(4) (1976), and New York allows 15, N.Y.
ENvIw
CONSERV. LAw § 71-0301 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
"9See, e.g., Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 629 & n.11 (1976) (construing statute narrowly to avoid constitutional problem caused by lack of hearing); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
I" E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125:84 (1978);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§

3704.032 (Page 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,

§

560 (1973). Utah

requires not only the Governor's concurrence, but also that a hearing be held before the
Governor within 24 hours after the emergency order is issued. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-2411(4) (1976). South Carolina merely requires notice to the Governor, who can then order
that a hearing be held within 48 hours after the emergency order is issued. S.C. CODE § 48-1290 (1977).
20 E.g., ALAsKA STAT. §§ 46.03.760, .765 (1977); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-787, -1715
(1974); id. §§ 36-1864, -1864.01 (Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1909 (1976); COLO. REv.
STAT. §§ 25-7-2, -122 (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-516 (West 1977); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7,

§ 6005

(Supp. 1978).

E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1906(7) (1976) (court may in its discretion and on own
motion or motion of party take additional evidence on any issue or try any or all issues de
201

novo; no jury); IND. STAT. ANN.§ 13-1-3-11 (Burns 1973) (action for compliance "shall" be
tried de novo, with right to jury); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.5(b) (1978) (matter "shall be

heard and determined de novo on the transcript [of the administrative hearing] ... and
any.., additional evidence"); W. VA. CODE § 16-20-10 (1979) (emergency orders reviewed
de novo).
202 E.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1868(c) (Supp. 1979Y (review in trial court limited
to "whether administrative record as may be supplemented by other evidence supports such
order or determination by substantial evidence"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-333 (Supp. 1979)
(review on transcripts only, and only as to whether decision was supported by substantial
evidence); UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 26-24-12

(1976) (review in state supreme court on transcripts,

limited to whether agency acted without or in excess of powers and whether findings were
supported by substantial evidence); VA. CODE § 10-17.23:2 (Supp. 1978) (air pollution) (review on transcript, order, exhibits, and "such additional evidence as may be necessary to
resolve any controversy as to the correctness of the record" or "as the ends of justice require"; no jury; court may modify or reverse if board acted unconstitutionally, in excess of
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view leaves debatable technical questions and policy matters to the
expert administrative body while preserving some vestige of the
constitutional assignment of judicial power to the courts. 20 B. Civil and Criminal Penalties
If no penalties could be assessed until after an administrative
cease-and-desist order had been violated, the polluter would get
one free bite; there would be no incentive for a polluter to comply
until caught. Consequently, most states authorize the imposition of
penalties for violations of the law and regulations as well as of an
earlier cease-and-desist order. Some allow the agency itself to impose monetary penalties; 204 in others, the agency, or the state attorney general on its behalf, must go to court.205
The nominal amounts of permissible penalties are in many
cases rather trivial. Nevada, for example, limits the penalty for a
violation to not more than $5,000.206 Yet "each day of violation"

under the Nevada statute "constitutes a separate offense"; 20 7 even
a small sum, compounded daily, may mount up significantly over
time. Nevertheless, such limits may make the threat of a penalty
an insufficient incentive for compliance when the cost of control
equipment is in the millions of dollars. Connecticut's basic approach is preferable. While absolute numerical limits unfortunately
remain, Connecticut authorizes its commissioner to establish a
penalty schedule in such amounts "as to insure immediate and
continued compliance with applicable laws, regulations, orders and
permits.12 0 Violation, in other words, is to be made more expen-

sive than compliance.209
authority or jurisdiction, on unlawful procedure or other error of law, or if action was "unsupported by the evidence on the record considered as a whole" or was "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion"); id. § 62.1-44.29 (1973) (water pollution) (same).
110See generally 4 K. DAvis, ADmiNsTRATVE LAW TREATISE §§ 29.01-.11 (1958).
oE.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-6b (West 1975 & Supp. 1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
11112,
1033(b) (1979); NEv. Rzv. STAT. § 445.601 (1979).
205 E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-28-22 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.25 (West Supp. 1980);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-12 (1979); N.D. CENr. CODE §§ 23-25-10 (1978); id. § 61-28-08
(Supp. 1979).
2- NEv. Rlv. STAT. § 445.601(1) (1979).
207

Id.

,03 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-6b(a) (West Supp. 1980).
10, Similar statutes include ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.760 (1977) ($500 to $100,000 for initial
violation and up to $5,000 per day thereafter, "which shall reflect ... the economic savings
realized by the person in not complying with the requirement for which a violation is
charged," id. § 46.03.760(a)(3); the penalty must not, however, be punitive-only "compensatory and remedial," id. § 46.03.760(b)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-170d (Supp. 1979) (penalty
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Criminal sanctions also are commonly provided, but usually
only for intentional or, in some cases, "criminally negligent" violations.210 No criminal penalties are provided for water pollution infractions in at least one state, Georgia.21 1
C.

Expenses and Damages

In addition to penalties, an agency frequently has the power to
seek compensation from a polluter. For instance, Nevada provides
that actual damages to the state may be recovered, 21 2 including
"any expenses incurred in removing, correcting and terminating
any adverse effects resulting from the discharge of pollutants" and
"compensation for any loss or destruction of wildlife, fish or
aquatic life and any other actual damages caused by the
'21 3
violation.
D.

Permits

Permit requirements for potential pollution sources serve a
number of purposes. Permit systems facilitate the collection of
necessary information; ensure continual surveillance rather than
spasmodic responses to complaints; make it possible to prevent
rather than merely abate pollution; allow a polluter to obtain a determination that proposed control devices will suffice before making an actual investment in them; and make enforcement easier by
2 14
requiring the polluter to prove compliance with the law.
For these reasons, and in order to qualify for participation in

of up to $10,000 per violation per day in an amount that "shall constitute an actual and
substantial economic deterrent to the violation," id. § 65-170d(b)); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 147.21
(West 1974) ("In determining the amount of the fine... the court shall assess an amount
which represents an actual and substantial economic deterrent to the action which was the
basis of the conviction," id. § 147.21(3), up to varying maxima dependent upon whether the
pollution was a first offense or was intentional).
210 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-13-3 (Burns Supp. 1980) ("intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or negligently"); NEV. Rav. STAT. § 445.334 (1979) (criminal penalties for anyone
"who intentionally or with criminal negligence" commits violation). Cf. ARIZ. Rzv. STAT.
ANN. § 36-1864.02 (Supp. 1979) (most violations of statute or regulations are punishable as a
class 2 misdemeanor; "criminal negligence" makes the discharge of a pollutant a class 1
misdemeanor).
" See GA. CODE ANN.§§ 17-502 to -528 (Supp. 1980). Id. § 17-521.2 provides for civil
penalties only.
2' Nav. Rzv. STAT. § 445.331(2) (1979).
13 Id. § 445.331(3). The most complex monetary provisions are found in relation to oil
spills, e.g., VA. CODE § 62.1-44.34 (Supp. 1980).
'14 See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 476.
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federal pollution control programs, 215 nearly every state pollution
statute requires permits for the construction or operation of potential sources, or for both. 216 In a few states it is left to the discretion
of the agency whether to require permits 21 or to delineate the classes of pollution sources for which permits are necessary.2 1 Some
statutes contain sensible exceptions for trivial sources, 219 or delegations of the authority to make such exceptions. 220 Construction
permits are more commonly required by air pollution statutes than
operating permits.2 2 States that make no provision for the latter
are forgoing an important enforcement device and information
source with respect to existing installations.
Until 1977 a state could participate in the federal air pollution
program without requiring any permits at all, so long as it provided for preconstruction "review" of the "location" of any new
source.2 22 While a permit program was the obvious means of providing such review, it was not the only means. The statute made it
'15 See 33 U.S.C. § 1256(f)(2) (1976); id. §§ 1319, 1342 (Supp. H 1978); 42 U.S.C.
7405, 7410(a)(2)(D) (Supp. II 1978).
216 A number of states specifically enclose the NPDES program in their pollution control statutes. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1904 (12)(2) (1976); GA. CODE ANN. 9 17-505(a)(16)
(Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115.03 (5) (West 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. 9 81-1505(11),
(19) (Supp. 1979); id. § 81-1506(2)(a) (Supp. 1978); Nav. REv. STAT. § 445.214 (1979); N.Y.
ENvn. CONsEaV. LAW §§ 17-0801 to -0829 (McKinney Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70328(8) (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1258(b) (Supp. 1980); WAsH. Rav. CODE ANN.
§ 90.48.260 (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-3(a)(1) (Supp. 1980). In other states, different combinations of the following activities may be carried out only under permit- installation, construction, modification, alteration, operation, use or maintenance of pollution
sources or control devices, or discharge therefrom. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, 1
1039(a) (1979).
217 E.g., CAL. HALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42300 (West 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22a-6(4) (West 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3008 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-7
(1979).
216 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 203.075(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (unlawful to commence construction of a contaminant source without permit "if such source is of a class fixed by regulation of the commission which requires a permit therefore"); W. VA. CODE § 16-20-11b
(1972) ("commission shall by rule and regulation specify the class or categories of stationary
sources" for which permits will be required).
2E.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1934 (1976) (exempting, inter alia,noncommercial barbecue equipment); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42310 (West 1979) (same).
110 E.g., COLO. RIV. STAT. § 25-7-114(5)(a) (Supp. 1979); WASH. RaV. CODE ANN.
§ 90.48.160 (Supp. 1979).
121 Compare ALAsKA
STAT. § 46.03.160 (1977) ("construction, installation or establishment"); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 25-7-112 (1974) (construction, substantial alteration, installation, and "commencement" of operation, conduct or performance) and N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 74-2-7 (1979) ("constructing or modifying") with Nav. REv. STAT. § 445.491 (1979) ("operating permits").
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(D) (1976) (revised and transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 7410
(Supp. 1[ 1978) by Act of Aug. 7, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 691).
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clear that a state satisfied the federal requirements if it provided
"adequate authority to prevent the construction or modification of
any new source . . . at any location which . . . will prevent the
attainment and maintenance... of a national ambient air quality
...

standard," and required that the owner "submit... such in-

formation as may be necessary to permit the State to make a determination" under the former clause. 22 3 Among the few jurisdic-

tions that have no permit provisions, Vermont and Wisconsin
appear to require the information and confer the authority formerly requisite for participation in the federal program;224 the District of Columbia and Oklahoma do not.225 Amendments to the

federal law in 1977 provide that a state pollution control plan will
not qualify unless it requires permits for all major new sources, 22 6
and it seems likely that the carrot of federal grants227 will bring
about the enactment of additional state permit requirements in
22
the near future. 8
The basic criterion for issuance of a permit follows logically
from its purposes: a permit will be granted upon a showing that
the activity will conform to all applicable substantive require-

ments.2 2 9 Various conditions are often imposed on the permit re223 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(4) (1976) (revised and transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp.
H 1978) by Act of Aug. 7, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 691).
"' VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 554(4) (authority to issue "orders as may be necessary to
effectuate the purposes of this chapter"); id. § 555(b) (1973) (required reports from operators of air contaminant sources); id. § 559 (authority to order "prevention" of emissions);
Wis. STAT. ANN. 144.31 (West 1974) (authority to issue "orders to effectuate the purpose" of
the chapter); id. § 144.35(1)(b) (authority to issue "appropriate order for the prevention...
of the problems involved" in a violation); id. § 144.38 (required reports from operators of
those types of air contaminant sources specified by state pollution control agency).
"5 D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 6-811 to -813 (West Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 1-1801 to -1808 (West Supp. 1979).
-6 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7475, 7502(b)(6) (Supp. 1[ 1978).
I" Id. § 7405 (Supp. II 1978).
2" Indeed, New York and Louisiana, which formerly had no provision for air pollution
permits, enacted permit provisions in 1979. N.Y. Eirm. CoNSERv. LAW §§ 19-0301 to -0302
(McKinney Supp. 1979); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:1084-:1085 (Supp. 1980).
22* See, e.g., CAL. HnsATH & SAFET CODE § 42301 (West 1979) (requiring that the
"article, machine, equipment or contrivance for which the permit was issued shall not prevent or interfere with the attainment or maintenance of any applicable air quality standard," id. § 42301(a), and "will comply with all applicable orders, rules, and regulations,"
id. § 42301(b)); COLO. Rlv. STAT. § 25-7-114(g)I(A) (Supp. 1978) ("proposed source or activity" must "meet all applicable emission control regulations"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.087
(West Supp. 1980) (permit allowed "only when ... the installation is provided or equipped
with pollution control facilities that will abate or prevent pollution to the degree that will
comply with the standards or rules promulgated by the department ...
and which will
comply with [federal regulations]").
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cipient to assure compliance;2 3 0 permits are usually issued for23a1
limited but renewable period, in order to assure reconsideration;
and revocation of the permit is generally provided as a remedy for
violation of permit conditions.23 2
As in the case of variances, 3 3 many states attempt to provide
an opportunity for the general public to participate in the permit
process. Colorado requires that notice of permit applications be
"circulated in a manner to inform interested and potentially interested persons of the proposed discharge and of the proposed determination to issue or deny a permit, 21 34 but it gives little guidance
on the vexing question of how that is to be accomplished.2 8 5 Texas
requires notice to "persons who in the judgment of the commission
may be affected" 2 6-an impossible task if individual notice is contemplated in all cases, and as unhelpful a formulation as Colorado's if it is not. 23 7 Other approaches to the same problem have
,30E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.051(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (if source "meets or will
meet" requirements of law and regulations, agency secretary "shall issue a permit with such
conditions as he deems necessary to insure that the source will meet the requirements [of
the act] and any federal water pollution control act as it applies to sources in this state");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-7(G) (1979) (permit may be conditioned on "individual emission
limits," "a requirement that such source install and operate best available control technology ... or technology sufficient to achieve the lowest achievable emission rate ... to the
extent necessary to meet the requirements of the federal act" and "reasonable restrictions
and limitations other than restrictions and limitations relating to emission limits or emission rates"); OHIO Rsv. CODE ANN.§ 3704.03(G) (Page 1980) (permits conditioned on right
of entry in reasonable fashion for inspection purposes).
"I E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 445.227 (1979) (water pollution permits issuable for "fixed
terms not to exceed 5 years").
132 E.g., CAL. HEmTH & SAFETY CODE § 42307 (West 1979) (revocation may be sought if
air pollution permit holder is in violation of "any applicable order, rule, or regulation");
COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-8-604 (1974) (suspension, modification or revocation for violation of
permit provision); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.087(6) (West 1973) (revocation for false or inaccurate information in application; violation of law, orders, rules, regulations, or permit conditions; failure to submit operational reports or refusal to permit inspection). Cf. Mo. STAT.
ANN. § 204.056(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980):
[Permits] may be terminated or modified if obtained in violation [of the act] or by
misrepresentation or failing to fully disclose all relevant facts, or when required to prevent violations of any provision [of the act] or to protect the waters of this state, when
such action is required by a change in conditions or the existence of a condition which
requires either a temporary or permanent reduction or elimination of the authorized
discharge ....
2" See text at notes 184-192 supra.
134 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 25-8-502(3) (1974).
23 The statute calls only for "circulation" in the geographic area of the discharge and
mailed notice to those who ask to be on a mailing list to be maintained by the pollution
control agency. Id. § 25-8-503.
" TEx. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 26.028 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
137 The statute does call for notice of certain permits to be given to the mayor and local
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been discussed above in connection with variances.238
Many state air or water pollution programs provide for some
type of public hearings on permit applications. Under the Connecticut water statute, hearings are mandatory in all cases; 23 9 such a

requirement may impose an unnecessary burden when the facts are
not subject to dispute.240 More commonly, hearings are mandatory

only on denial of a permit, and then only when requested by the
aggrieved applicant,2

41

presumably because only the applicant is

likely to have a constitutionally protected interest in the matter. 42
VI.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Illinois has a unique mechanism for the administration of its
pollution control program. An Environmental Protection Agency
subject to the Governor fills the role of prosecutor; an independent
Pollution Control Board, composed of full-time officials, acts as the
rulemaking and adjudicatory authority; and long-range planning is
in the hands of an independent Institute of Natural Resources.?"
As I have pointed out previously, 244 I believe this is a highly desir-

able enforcement system.
Unfortunately, no other state has followed this example. Instead, three basic organizations have been employed: (1) the executive department, or a division thereof; (2) a part-time board of
citizens, executive department representatives, and/or interest representatives, employing an executive secretary and staff; and (3) an
executive department in conjunction with a part-time board or
health officials. In addition, an applicant may choose to attempt to avoid a hearing by publishing notice in newspapers and submitting a list of people he expects will be affected to
the state agency; if neither a member of the public nor an official of the state agency complains, no hearing is necessary. Id.
See text at notes 184-192 supra.
131 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-54i (West Supp. 1980). Cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1263(b) (1973) (requiring agency to give notice and "opportunity" for hearing or written
comments before deciding).
M This stringent requirement is particularly surprising in light of the state's air statute, which makes no provision for holding hearings in relation to permits for the construction or modification of a pollution source, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-519a (West 1977),
and even as to variances, requires hearings only before an application may be granted, id.
§ 19-519. In either case, for an applicant who has been denied a permit, the only statutory
means of relief is to appeal to the courts. Id. § 19-918 (West Supp. 1980).
11 E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.160(c) (1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-10-4 (Burns Supp.
1980); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 75-5-403 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-7(K), (L) (1979).
141 See text and notes at notes 188-189 supra.
13 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1111/, If 1004-1006.1 (1979).
24 See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 444-49.
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commission.

A. The Executive Department
Many states have chosen to place one or more of their pollution control programs under the sole administration of an executive department. 24 Alaska, for example, has a separate executive
department, headed by a commissioner of environmental conservation, that administers a coordinated program for controlling pollution of water, land, air, and other resources.2 46 The powers of the

Alaska department are comprehensive. It has "responsibility for
coordination and development of policies, programs and planning,"
and for both "promulgation and enforcement of regulations setting
standards for the prevention . . . of pollution. ' 247 Although one
avenue of enforcement is to seek injunctions or civil or criminal
penalties in the courts, 48 the statute also authorizes the depart-

ment itself to issue "compliance orders" to violators.24 9 Thus the

department combines the executive function of prosecution, the
legislative function of rulemaking, and the judicial function of
adjudication.
The great advantages of such a unified structure are professionalism and efficiency. No responsibility is given to part-time
amateurs; there are no multiple staffs duplicating each other's
work. The great disadvantage is the loss of the important protections against abuse of authority found in the typical constitutional
separation of powers. The most disturbing consequence is that
under such statutes the same agency that prosecutes a charge determines whether it has proved its own case.
Thus in Alaska a person to whom a notice of violation and a
subsequent compliance order has been issued by the "department"
is entitled to a hearing before the same body; after the hearing, it

§§

245 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 19-505 to -520a (West 1977 & Supp. 1980); id.
22a-2 to -10, 25-54a to -54xx (West 1975 & Supp. 1980) (air and water pollution control

programs administered by commissioner of environmental protection. It should be noted
that Connecticut does provide for the creation of an independent board, but its duties are
purely advisory and it has no real control over the state's pollution control efforts. See id.
§§ 22a-11 to -13 (West 1975 & Supp. 1980).); OHio Rav. CODE. ANN. §§ 3704.01-.09 (Page
1980); id. §§ 6111.01-.99 (Page 1977 & Supp. 1980) (air and water programs under a director
of environmental protection).
24" See generally ALAsKA STAT. §§ 44.46.010-.020 (1976); id. §§ 46.03.010-.35.210 (1977
& Supp. 1979).
247Id. § 44.46.020(1)-(2) (1976).
248Id. §§ 46.03.760, .765, .790 (1977).
-" Id.

§ 46.03.850.
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is the same "department" that determines whether or not to rescind the initial order.2 50 Under the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act 251 the hearing is conducted by a "qualified, unbiased, and
impartial hearing officer,"2 5' but this requirement falls consider-

ably short of a meaningful separation of prosecutorial and judicial
functions. The hearing officer himself, despite the comforting
terms "unbiased" and "impartial," is assigned by the Governor, '
who is also ultimately responsible for prosecution. The hearing officer "may perform other duties," apparently even within the
agency,25 4 and there is no prohibition on his working with the

prosecutorial staff. The agency itself may hear the case "with the
hearing officer," and if it does it may retain all authority over the
hearing except to "rule on the admission and exclusion of evidence.

25

5

While the hearing officer is required to prepare a "pro-

posed decision" if he hears the case alone, and to be present at any
deliberations concerning a case he heard with the agency, the department need not give his findings any deference whatever in
making the ultimate decision.25 6 Thus the commissioner is prosecu-

tor and judge in the same case. If this is not considered a deprivation of property without due process, 2

57

it should be; and it ought

to be changed as a matter of policy.
The Alaska statute also calls for an environmental advisory
board.25 8 These advisory boards commonly are created by states in

which the administration of the control program is vested solely in
an executive department, 59 although they are also present in other
types of administration.2 6 0 The Alaska board consists of the com-

missioner of environmental conservation, serving as chairman, and
eight members, not officers or employees of any state agency, servId.
Id. § 44.62.010-.650 (1976 & Supp. 1979), made applicable by id. § 46.03.880 (1977).
252Id. § 44.62.350 (1976).
150
1

3

Id.

54 Id.
:55 Id. § 44.62.450.
"Id. § 44.62.500.
26" Compare In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (combination of judicial and grand

jury functions constituted violation of due process) and In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172
A.2d 835 (1961) (disbarment hearings where court's Committee on Offenses acted as prosecutor, judge, and jury constituted violation of due process) with Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35 (1975) (combining investigative and adjudicative functions in licensing body did not con-

stitute violation of due process) (semble).
:58 ALAsKA STAT. §§ 44.46.030-.050 (1976).
"' See, e.g., the Connecticut statutes discussed in note 245 supra.
.0 See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 10-17.9:1-.30:1 (1978 & Supp. 1980).
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ing at the pleasure of the Governor.2 6 1 They receive a modest per
diem allowance and expenses. 2 62 The board's duties are to "advise
the commissioner," "serve as a forum" for debate on the environment, recommend outstanding environmentalists for recognition
by the state, and "perform such other functions as may be requested by the commissioner. ' 263 Although this board could be
made a significant source of valuable advice if the department so
chose, it seems more likely that its principal function will be maintaining good public relations.
B.

Nonadvisory Board with Executive Secretary

Virginia vests all powers of air pollution control in a five-member Air Pollution Control Board,'
whose members are to be selected "for their ability," "without regard to political affiliation,"
and who may not be "officer[s] or representative[s] of any industry, county, city or town which may become subject to the rules
and regulations of the Board. '265 Members receive "fifty dollars
per day, plus reasonable and necessary expenses, for each day or
portion thereof in which the member is engaged in the business" of
the Board. 2 6 They are required to meet "at least every three
months. 2 6 7
This Board is given the authority to adopt regulations, to
grant variances, to investigate violations, to "initiate and receive
complaints," to "enter orders for the purpose of enforcement of its
rules or regulations," and to institute court enforcement proceedings.268 It is also authorized to hire a staff and appoint a full-time
"executive director," who "shall exercise such authority to administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter and rules, regulations and orders of the Board as is conferred upon him by the

t

ALASKA STAT. § 44.46.030 (1976). The members are appointed to staggered terms. Id.

2

Id. § 44.46.040.

2 Id. § 44.46.050.
VA. CODE §§ 10-17.9:1-.30:1 (1978 & Supp. 1980).
26 Id. § 10-17.12 (Supp. 1980).
Id. §§ 2.1-20.3-.4 (Supp. 1980). Board members are appointed for staggered fouryear terms by the Governor and must be confirmed by the legislature. Id. § 10-17.11 (1978).
It is worth noting the contrast with the Alaska appointment process, see text and note at
note 261 supra. The Virginia Board's greater powers apparently led the legislature to retain
more control over and leave the Governor less discretion in the appointment of board
members.
"' VA. CODE § 10-17.15 (1978).
2" Id. § 10-17.18 (Supp. 1980).
'"
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Board.,, 269

The appointment of a citizen board appears to be an effort to
broaden the base of decision making and to avoid the dangers of
bureaucratic stagnation. But pollution control is not a task that
can be performed intelligently by essentially unpaid amateurs
meeting four times a year. The Virginia scheme seems to ensure
that those charged with the ultimate administrative authority over
pollution control will not have the foggiest notion of what they are
doing.
Moreover, this structure fails to provide a meaningful separation of prosecutor and judge. Nothing in the statute ensures that
the Director is to prosecute and the Board is to decide. The statute
allows the Board to delegate to him both functions or neither. Presumably the Board might itself create an ostensible separation of
functions by delegating the entire prosecution task while retaining
the power of decision, but in the absence of sufficient expertise and
paid time to reach an independent decision, it seems all too likely
that the Board would still be essentially the puppet of the
Director.
Some statutes of this type limit the functions that may officially be delegated to the Director. Virginia's Water Pollution Control Board, for example, must itself promulgate regulations, revoke
certificates and permits, and issue enforcement orders.2 70 This

variation does little to overcome the objections rehearsed above. In
the first place the statute does not require the Board to divest itself of authority over the institution and control of prosecution.
Moreover, the institutional weakness of the Board strongly suggests that the Director will dominate the decision making process
nominally entrusted to the Board.
In Indiana and Minnesota the board does not choose its executive director

71

and thus cannot control him; thus there is no fear

that he will simply be the tool of the board. Unfortunately, the
preceding discussion suggests that the real problem underlying all
these statutes is the reverse; making the director independent does
::" Id. § 10-17.14 (1978).
2 Id.

§ 62.1-44.14 (1973). The California water pollution statute is similar. CAL. WATER

CODE § 13223 (West 1971).
171 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-1-3 (Burns 1973) (technical secretary of air pollution control
board named by secretary of state board of health); id. § 13-1-3-3 (technical secretary of
stream pollution control board named by secretary of state board of health); id. § 13-7-2-2
(technical secretary of environmental management board designated ex officio by statute);
MN. STAT. ANN. § 116.03(i)(a) (West Supp. 1979) (director appointed by Governor).

74
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nothing to reduce the dependence of the nominally sovereign
board upon him.
C. The Executive Department and Nonadvisory Board
In contrast to the provisions just discussed, in which in theory
the executive director is the agent of an all-powerful board, the
more common pattern is to divide authority for pollution control
between an executive department and an independent board.
Idaho, for example, has vested all rulemaking and adjudicatory powers in the Board of Health and Welfare, composed of
seven members who serve four-year terms and are removable only
for cause.27 2 Executive powers, on the other hand, including the
authority to prosecute complaints before the Board, are entrusted
to the Director of the Department of Health and Welfare, who
serves at the Governor's pleasure. 7 3
Thus the Idaho statute carefully separates the prosecutor from
the judge as a matter of theory. Yet a closer look at the Idaho
provisions raises serious doubts whether the ostensible separation
can actually be maintained in practice. The Idaho Board, like the
Virginia boards, is made up of part-time volunteers: its members
are to receive minimal per diem compensation and expenses when
"in the actual performance of duties. 2 7 4 Members who are not
paid to study the cases they are supposed to decide can hardly be
expected to render an informed, independent judgment.
The Idaho pattern is followed in several other states, but the
variations are considerable. In Wyoming, for example, the Department of Environmental Quality issues permits, grants variances,
and utters cease-and-desist orders; divisional administrators are to
recommend regulations to its director.
Yet the "independent"
Environmental Quality Council has the power to review department actions on permits, variances, and cease-and-desist orders,
and the statute's repeated use of the phrase "the council finds"
suggests that it is not bound to give any deference to the Department's findings.27 6 Moreover, no regulation becomes law without
272 IDAHO CODE § 39-107(1)-(2)

27.
27
1980).
27
-6

(Supp. 1979).

Id. § 39-104 (1977).
Members receive $50 a day and travel expenses. Id. §§ 39-107(3), 59-509(h) (Supp.
Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-11-104 to -110 (1977).
Id. §§ 35-11-111 to -112, -601, -701, -801, -802.
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Council approval.2 7 7 In short, the Council has ultimate rulemaking
and adjudicating authority, just as in Idaho; but as in Idaho, Council members receive only a trivial per diem allowance and expenses,2 78 so its independence may be largely imaginary.
In Oregon a five-member commission adopts regulations,
grants variances, and holds hearings to determine the imposition of
civil penalties, 79 while an "executive-administrative" Department
20
of Environmental Quality is directed to "seek enforcement.
Again the Commission is essentially unpaid, receiving $30 per day
of actual work plus expenses; 8 1 it would be surprising if such a
body could hold its own. Moreover, even the nominal separation of
functions in Oregon leaves much to be desired. For one thing, the
Department is empowered to "commence enforcement proceedings " 8 under the state Administrative Procedure Act, "8 which
does not require so much as an independent hearing examiner, and
to render a decision upon its own complaint.2 84 For another, the
Commission appoints and removes the Director of the Department
at pleasure;2 8 5 it has power "to establish the policies for the operation of the department; " and in everything it does the Department is "[s]ubject to policy direction by the commission. '287 Despite the statutory terminology, the differences between Oregon's
system and the executive-director programs discussed in the preceding section are slim indeed.
In other states the role of the board or commission is more
attenuated. In Delaware the secretary of an executive department
adopts regulations, prosecutes and rules upon complaints, and
grants permits and variances. "8 The sole function of the board
(which is paid only expenses2 89 ) is to entertain appeals by persons
"substantially affected by an action of the secretary. 2 ' The statId. § 35-11-112(c).
Id. § 25-11-111(e).
27 OR. REv. STAT. §§ 468.010-.997 (1979).
280 Id. §§ 468.030, 468.035.
281 Id. §§ 292.495, 468.010(3).
282 Id. § 468.090.
- Id. §§ 183.310-.500.
2- Id. § 183.464.
2- Id. § 468.040.
286 Id. § 468.015.
287 Id. § 468.035.
2" DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6002-6008, 6010-6012 (1975).
"I Id. § 6007(e).
8 Id. § 6008(a).
17

28
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ute does not answer the crucial question whether the board's review is to be de novo. De novo review by an effective independent
board would substantially ameliorate the initial combination of
prosecutor and judge in the secretary, but even if the Delaware
board is not expected to defer to any reasonable findings by the
secretary, its part-time and poorly compensated nature seems
likely to render it less than effective.
In Vermont there is not even a pretense of separating prosector from judge. The secretary of the executive agency has nearly all
the functions of his Delaware counterpart, 2 1 and the five-member
board of amateurs29 2 has only the power to grant variances. 298
D. Board Member Qualifications
The Idaho statute is very general in prescribing the qualifications of Board members. They are to be "chosen with due regard
to their knowledge and interest in environmental protection and
health," and no more than four of the seven may be of the same
political party.294 Many statutes are much more specific. It is com-

mon, for example, to require that one member be a physician, or
an engineer, or an attorney.9 5 Each of these disciplines obviously
has something to contribute to the work of the board-the doctor
understands some of the effects of pollution, the engineer something about control devices, the lawyer something about the legal
rules. Just as obviously, however, people with other professions,
such as ichthyology, or interested citizens with no expertise at all,
may have something to contribute; the urge to require particular
skills risks disqualifying the candidate for a particular vacancy who
has the most to offer. The limit on the number of members from
one political party, while an understandable precaution against
cronyism, is subject to the same criticism.
Professional and political requirements are not the only types
21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 554 (1973).
112

Id. § 553(b) (Supp. 1980). The board is to be composed of a lawyer, a manufacturer,

an engineer, a businessman, and a member of the general public, none of whom may be
employed by the state in any other capacity.
29 Id. § 561 (1973).
294 IDAHO CODE

§ 39-107(1) (Supp. 1980).

29" E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3745.02 (Page Supp. 1980) ("Each member shall have

extensive experience in pollution control and abatement technology, ecology, public health,
environmental law, economics of natural resource development, or related fields. At least
one shall be an attorney."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553(b) (Supp. 1980) (board must include lawyer, manufacturer, engineer, businessman, and representative of public).
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of qualifications imposed on board membership. Arizona's Water
Quality Control Council, for example, is composed partly of the
following people or their delegates: the director of the department
of health services; members of the state game and fish, oil and gas
conservation, and water commissions; the state land commissioner;
and the dean of the state university agricultural college.2 96 In addition, the Governor is to appoint seven members, at least one of
whom must come from each congressional district and:
one shall be appointed from the utility industry, one from the
livestock industry, one from the forest products industry, one
from the mining industry, one shall be appointed to represent
the league of cities and towns and two shall be appointed
from irrigation districts or water user associations. At least
one of the foregoing shall be a civil engineer registered in
97
Arizona.
Two distinct principles of selection are exemplified by the Arizona statute. The first is the presence of officials of various executive branch agencies. New Mexico has carried this idea even further; its Water Quality Control Commission is made up almost
entirely of executive officials. 9 One evident goal of this approach
is to facilitate coordination of executive policy on environmental
matters by creating what is in effect a subcabinet to dispose of
them. Another advantage is that ex officio members can devote
substantial time to their pollution control tasks at government expense, which makes for a stronger board. The major disadvantage
is that dominance of the executive in an adjudicatory body effectively undermines the separation of prosecutor from judge that was
the primary apparent virtue justifying a separate board. Even
when executive members are in a minority, as in Arizona, the separation is inadequate to satisfy ordinary notions of fair play: we do
not put the United States Attorney on a panel of the Court of
Appeals.
The second principle of selection found in the Arizona law is
that the board should be broadly representative of the interest

"' ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1853 (1974).
2" Id. § 36-1853(7).
" N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-3 (1979) (commission consists of representatives of the envi-

ronmental improvement division of the health and environment department, the game and
fish department, the state engineer, the state park and recreation commission, the agriculture department, the natural resources conservation commission, the bureau of mines, the
state engineer's office, and a lone representative of the public).
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groups affected by the pollution control program. Not only are
specified polluting groups, from utilities to farmers to municipal
governments, entitled to a voice, but many of the state government
members also seem likely to view their role as that of spokesman
for assorted interests their parent agencies represent. Representative government is a concept most Americans believe in, and big
corporations may be able to finance released time to permit meaningful member participation. A glance at the Arizona list, however,
gives cause for concern that the council may not come anywhere
near reflecting the composition of the affected population. To state
the matter more baldly, Arizona has placed the pollution control
program in the hands of the polluters.
Other states have attempted to create more balanced combinations. In Tennessee, for example, three government representatives-one representative of the "public-at-large," one representative of conservation interests, one municipal representative, and
one industrial representative-comprise the water quality control
board.299 "No member shall be appointed unless at the time of his
appointment he or his employer is in compliance with the provisions of [the Water Quality Control Act] as certified by the commissioner"; °° and only "[t]hose members of the board who do not
receive, or during the previous two (2) years have not received a
significant portion of their income directly or indirectly from permit holders or applicants for a permit shall constitute a permit
hearing panel."30 1
Nevertheless, the danger remains that no board with a membership small enough to be able to function as a coherent administrative body is likely to contain representatives of every affected
interest. More fundamentally, the effort to create a representative
agency seems contrary to one of the basic reasons legislatures delegate rulemaking power to begin with-the desire for decision making based not on political power but on an objective search for the
public good. If pollution standards are to be set on a representative
basis, they should be set by a truly representative body: the elected
state legislature.
The Pennsylvania Environmental Quality Board, which has
rulemaking powers, has an unusual membership component. It
consists of twelve ex officio members, five members of the citizens'

2" TENN. CODE ANN.
300

Id.

301 Id. § 70-327(b).

§ 70-327(a) (Supp. 1979).
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advisory council, and four members of the General Assembly.3 0 2
The addition of legislators seems superficially attractive as a
means of legislative control over the essentially legislative business
of rulemaking. But if constitutional provisions for separation of
powers retain any meaning, it must give pause that executive and
legislative officials share the responsibility for a single task under
this system.
E.

State, Local, and Regional Authority

Most state pollution control programs today are statewide in
effect. Many of the relevant statutes make no mention of local
powers;3 03 most of the others specifically permit local ordinances to
be enacted as long as they are not inconsistent with the state
program. 30
In rare instances, "consistency" requires a perfect match, as in
West Virginia, where the Attorney General ruled that local ordinances must be neither more nor less strict than state regulations.30 5 This requirement allows local governments to participate
in enforcement, but it denies them all ability to set standards to
protect their inhabitants. Connecticut's provision is more typical:
local ordinances are permissible if no less strict than state law. 08
Some states take an intermediate position, reflecting the potential
conflict between legitimate local interests and overall state needs.
In Virginia, for example, local ordinances are subject to approval
by the state authority;3 0 7 in Florida the state administration may
preempt control over certain sources.308 Thus local desire for
stricter control may normally be accommodated, but parochial
interests will not be allowed to prevent the location of necessary
waste-disposal facilities everywhere in the State.
A few states still leave certain pollution matters largely or entirely to local governments. In New Mexico, for instance, the statute requires local governments in "A class counties" to establish
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-1 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 224.005-.520 (1977 & Supp. 1978); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-17-1 to -43 (1973 & Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1251-1283 (1973 & Supp.
1980) (water program).
304 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-7-128 (Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-3426 (Supp.
1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-17 (1976).
:05 Opinion of Mar. 30, 1972, reprinted in W. VA. CODE § 16-20-5 app. (1979).
801

3

so CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
'o,
£08

19-520a (West 1977).

VA. CODE § 10-17.30 (1978).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 430.182 (West 1973 & Supp. 1980).
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programs to enforce the state statute by means of ordinances required to be at least as strict as state regulations. State jurisdiction
does not extend to areas that have complied with this directive,
except in case of "any act or failure to act" by the local government itself. If a local government fails to prosecute a violator, the
state agency clearly can prosecute the local government itself for
its inaction; whether the state may also proceed directly against
the violator, which would have the advantage of curing the violation, is not clear from the words of the statute.3 0 9
Arizona appears to leave even more to local control. A state air
pollution board and department are to exercise "jurisdiction and
control" over "major sources," publicly owned sources, motor vehicles, and other "portable" sources.3 10 Everything else is within the
ken of county or multi-county regions subject to local control; but
their regulations may not be less stringent than comparable state
requirements. 1 1 A further provision authorizes the state to take
over the functions of the local districts, but without specifying the
grounds on which such action may be taken. 1 2 Apparently this
permits the state to negate the flat statutory insistence that, except for the specified sources, "jurisdiction and control of air pollution shall be by the county or multi-county air quality control
region."' 13
A few states create their own institutions to handle pollution
control on a local basis, rather than entrusting that function to local government. The most intricate plan of this sort is found in
California. Simply put, the California air pollution control program
is overseen by a state board that adopts air quality standards for
each region and serves as a backup enforcement mechanism. Regions are designated, largely by statute, as control districts, and
district boards are appointed in a multitude of ways by local officials. If more than one district is located in a single air basin, a
basin-wide council with rulemaking power is created. The state
board has no financial control over districts, because funds are
raised through additions to local property taxes. 3 14 California's
N.M. STAT. ANN.
310 ARIZ. RIv. STAT.
31 Id. § 36-779.
M' Id. § 36-1706(B).
313 Id.
309

314

1980).

§ 74-2-4 (1979).
ANN.

§ 36-1706(A) (1974).

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§§ 39000-39108, 40000-40865 (West 1979 & Supp.
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water pollution control program operates in much the same way.3 15
Regionalization is evidently an attempt to preserve local autonomy and to allow for varying local needs. Its costs include the
multiplication of bureaucracies, the dispersion of qualified personnel, and the risk of abdication of state responsibility for protecting
the public.
CONCLUSION

The details of the pollution laws vary greatly from state to
state; no uniform statute has found widespread favor in this field.
Yet the fundamentals of the program are strikingly similar nearly
everywhere. The basic pattern is to delegate broad rulemaking
power to an administrative agency, with enforcement through
administrative permits and orders, injunctions, and judicial or administrative penalties, and commonly with the safety valve of administrative variances for cases of special hardship.
Some of the deviations from this pattern appear to limit significantly the effectiveness or appropriateness of the program.
Some states are too grudging in their delegations of rulemaking authority; some lack a formal mechanism for dealing with hardship
cases or an adequate permit system; some provide penalties too
small to deter. In general, however, the statutory authority is basically sufficient; whether a state's control efforts are satisfactory is
essentially within the control of the administering agency. Perhaps
the most disturbing aspect of most state programs is the lack of
effective separation between prosecutor and judge, which in my
opinion is only glossed over, not corrected, by the vesting of adjudicatory powers in an unpaid citizen board.

3,,

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-13389 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980).

